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DRIVING DANGEROUSLY: VEHICLE FLIGHT AND THE 
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT AFTER SYKES v. 
UNITED STATES 
Isham M. Reavis 
Abstract: The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a federal “three-strikes” recidivist 
statute, applies a mandatory enhancement to sentences of criminal defendants previously 
convicted of three qualifying predicate crimes. In Sykes v. United States the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a conviction for fleeing police by car counted as a predicate under ACCA’s 
residual provision for crimes that “otherwise involve conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.” ACCA’s residual provision has produced a confusing 
series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, each applying a different method for determining its 
scope. Though Sykes borrows methods from each of these prior cases, this Comment argues 
that only the narrowest of its bases—a finding of risk based on the statutory features of the 
state crime—controlled its outcome. This basis suffices to explain Sykes’ outcome, and best 
comports with the Court’s own precedent mandating a categorical approach when 
interpreting ACCA. Under the categorical approach, a court may consider only the elements 
of a crime, not the particulars of its commission by an individual defendant, to determine 
whether it qualifies as a predicate offense under ACCA. Applying this interpretation of Sykes 
in future cases, only vehicle-flight convictions that either (1) require risk of physical injury to 
another as an element themselves or (2) share the same punishment as a comparable offense 
containing this element will qualify under ACCA’s residual provision. However, in Sykes’ 
wake most federal courts have read Sykes broadly, employing reasoning this Comment 
argues is inconsistent with faithful application of the categorical approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to illegally possessing a firearm 
in 2008,1 nearly every day of his more than fifteen-year sentence—all 
but eight months out of 188—sprang from a five-year-old prior 
conviction. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) ratcheted what 
might otherwise have been jail time of less than five years for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm to more than fifteen years behind bars,2 
                                                     
1. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) prohibits convicted felons, among other categories of prohibited 
persons including aliens and those adjudged mentally defective, from shipping, transporting, 
possessing, or receiving firearms or ammunition in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 
2. When ACCA applies, it imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum. Id. § 924(e)(1). Given 
Sykes’ criminal history and prior sentences on comparable facts from the Southern District of 
Indiana, his attorney estimated that absent application of ACCA his sentence would have been 
between fifty-seven and seventy-one months. Joint Appendix Vol. I at 19, Sykes v. United States, 
__U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (No. 09-11311), 2010 WL 4628573 at *23 [hereinafter “Joint 
Appendix”]. 
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based on Sykes’ prior conviction in 2003 for fleeing when police tried to 
pull him over for driving without headlights.3 
Sykes was arrested in March of 2008 after attempting to rob two 
people parked outside an Indianapolis liquor store.4 Sykes maintained 
that he had merely approached to speak to one of the car’s occupants, a 
woman he knew.5 The Government asserted he instead tried to rob them 
at gunpoint, and only aborted his plans after recognizing one of his 
intended victims.6 While the federal district court found police 
information sufficient to conclude that Sykes had attempted robbery,7 he 
was not convicted for that crime, pleading only to illegal firearm 
possession.8 What he had been doing with the gun before his arrest only 
mattered inasmuch as possessing a firearm in connection with another 
felony lengthened his sentence.9 
The majority of Sykes’ sentence resulted from the fifteen-year 
minimum imposed by ACCA and triggered by his prior felony 
convictions.10 Whether Sykes had attempted robbery made no difference 
for ACCA purposes—ACCA applies to sentencing for the federal 
offense of illegal firearm possession whenever the convict’s history 
contains three qualifying predicate convictions.11 These predicates may 
be any combination of “serious drug offenses” and “violent felonies.”12 
ACCA defines “violent felonies,” the category at issue in Sykes’ case, as 
any offense punishable by at least a year of imprisonment that either (1) 
requires the element of actual, attempted, or threatened use of force; (2) 
is burglary, arson, extortion, or involves using explosives; or (3) 
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
                                                     
3. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2272; United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 335 (7th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 131 
S. Ct. 2267. 
4. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 7; Brief for the United States at ¶ 1, Sykes v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2267 (No. 09-11311), 2010 WL 5087868 at *16 [hereinafter “U.S. Brief”]. 
5. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 7. 
6. Id. at 10. 
7. Id. at 13. 
8. See id. at 15 (“I mean, I didn’t try to rob them people, but I did hold the gun. I just want to say 
I apologize.”). 
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2008) (applying a four-level 
sentencing enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another felony). Sykes argued 
for a sentence of 180 months; the court calculated his range under the Sentencing Guideline as 188 
to 235 months, and sentenced him to 188. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 8, 23. 
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). 
11. See id. 
12. Id. 
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physical injury to another.”13 Sykes conceded his two 1996 robbery 
convictions qualified as ACCA predicate crimes under the first prong.14 
He disputed, however, the Government’s claim that his 2003 vehicle 
flight should count as a violent felony under the third “otherwise 
involving” category15—the so-called “residual provision.”16 
The district court rejected Sykes’ vehicle-flight argument17—which 
Sykes admitted was foreclosed by a recent Seventh Circuit decision18—
and on appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed.19 In a 6–3 opinion written by 
Justice Kennedy, so did the U.S. Supreme Court.20 
In the wake of Sykes v. United States, 21 district and circuit courts have 
uniformly found vehicle flight to be a violent felony or a “crime of 
violence” (a nearly synonymous term from the federal sentencing 
guidelines)22 whether reaffirming their pre-Sykes interpretations,23 
                                                     
13. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B). 
14. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 8–9. 
15. Id. at 9.  
16. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 197–98 (2007) (referring to the “otherwise 
involves” clause as “ACCA’s residual provision”).  
17. See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 22 (holding at Sykes’ sentencing hearing that “under 
these circumstances” his statutory sentencing range was between fifteen years and life 
imprisonment). 
18. Id. at 9. The preclusive holding appeared in United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 753–54 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
19. United States v. Sykes, 598 F.3d 334, 337–39 (7th Cir. 2010), aff’d __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267 
(2011). 
20. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
21. __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
22. The two terms share nearly identical definitions. Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2010) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state 
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . (2) is burglary of a 
dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” (emphasis added)), with 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another . . . .”). “Because the two provisions are so similar, all circuits have treated the case law 
regarding ‘violent felony’ and ‘crime of violence’ as fungible both before and after Begay[v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008)].” David C. Holman, Violent Crimes and Known Associates: The 
Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 43 CONN. L. REV. 209, 236 (2010). 
23. See United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 795, 801–02 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
__U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012) (holding an Indiana vehicle-flight conviction a crime of violence); 
United States v. Tubbs, No. 10-51043, 2011 WL 5026393 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011), cert denied, No. 
11-8298, 2012 WL 123815 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding a Texas vehicle-flight conviction a violent 
felony); United States v. Garrison, No. 11-10105, 2011 WL 3630116 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) 
(same); United States v. Lamar, 419 F. App’x 704 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 1323 S. 
Ct. 538 (holding a Missouri vehicle-flight conviction a violent felony); United States v. Wilson, No. 
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considering statutes for the first time,24 or reversing course on vehicle-
flight laws previously held not to qualify as violent felonies.25 The lower 
courts’ across-the-board response reflects Justice Kennedy’s broad 
declaration in Sykes that “[f]elony vehicle flight is a violent felony for 
purposes of ACCA.”26 However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior 
guidance for interpreting ACCA, a summary opinion following on 
Sykes’ heels, and parts of the Sykes opinion itself suggest the lower 
courts may be reading the case too broadly. 
First, it is not obvious on its face that ACCA should treat all vehicle-
flight convictions the same. Since ACCA’s enactment, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has mandated a categorical approach to interpreting ACCA.27 This 
categorical approach does not consider the particular commission of a 
crime by a particular defendant, but rather requires a court to look only 
to the statute and elements defining the offense in the abstract to 
determine whether it qualifies as an ACCA predicate.28 Only if the state 
crime meets the definition of one of ACCA’s predicate categories will it 
count towards triggering ACCA’s sentence enhancement—ACCA’s 
enumerated burglary predicate requires a set of generic elements,29 for 
example, and a “serious drug offense” predicate must be punishable by 
ten years’ imprisonment and involve manufacturing, distributing, or 
possessing a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or 
distribute.30 But because states define their respective vehicle-flight 
                                                     
11-1147, 2011 WL 4381703 (7th Cir. Sep. 21, 2011) (holding a Michigan vehicle-flight conviction 
a crime of violence); United States v. Stout, 439 Fed. App’x 738, 748–50 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 11-8233, 2012 WL 113421 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (holding an Oklahoma vehicle-flight 
conviction a crime of violence). 
24. See United States v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding as a matter of first 
impression that a Kansas vehicle-flight conviction was a crime of violence). 
25. United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 698–700 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 
11-8249 (Dec. 30, 2011) (holding that an Oregon vehicle-flight conviction was a crime of violence 
after reaching the opposite conclusion in the preliminary disposition of United States v. Peterson, 
No. 07-30465, 2009 WL 3437834 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009), withdrawn and replaced by 2011 WL 
5041673 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011)). 
26. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2277. 
27. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599–602 (1990) (holding that a Missouri burglary 
conviction failed to qualify as “burglary” for ACCA purposes using a categorical approach in the 
first case calling the Court to interpret ACCA). 
28. See id. at 602 (describing the categorical approach). 
29. See id. at 599 (“If the state statute is narrower than the generic view, e.g., in cases of burglary 
in common-law states or convictions of first-degree or aggravated burglary, there is no problem, 
because the conviction necessarily implies that the defendant has been found guilty of all the 
elements of generic burglary.”).  
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (defining requirements of a state crime qualifying as 
a serious drug offense). 
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offenses differently, it is not a given that every state’s version will 
categorically meet the residual provision’s threshold requirements. 
Second, Rogers v. United States,31 handed down just eleven days after 
Sykes, calls into question whether Sykes definitively gathers every 
vehicle-flight offense—no matter how defined—into the ACCA-
predicate camp. In Rogers, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
summarily vacated, and remanded a Sixth Circuit opinion that had found 
violation of the Tennessee vehicle-flight statute to be a “crime of 
violence,”32 the practical equivalent to a violent felony.33 If Sykes stands 
for the proposition that vehicle flight, however defined under state law, 
always constitutes a violent felony, remanding Rogers serves no obvious 
goal not already served by denying certiorari and letting the lower court 
decision stand. 
Finally, Sykes itself does not clearly compel uniformly bundling 
vehicle flight into ACCA’s residual provision. Justice Kennedy noted 
that the Seventh Circuit opinion upheld in Sykes was only “in tension,” 
rather than in direct conflict with, Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases 
excluding vehicle-flight convictions from the residual provision.34 Sykes 
itself deploys several methods for determining whether to include 
vehicle flight in the residual provision but leaves murky which one 
controls the case’s result.35 Depending on which method was the 
dispositive basis, Sykes either justifies the lower court’s lockstep 
response or, as Justice Kagan declares in her dissent, “decides almost no 
case other than this one.”36 
Significant periods of imprisonment hang in the balance. Congress 
designed ACCA to carry lengthy, incapacitating penalties,37 and Sykes’ 
own case demonstrates the heavy blow it delivers. Interpreting Sykes 
broadly thus threatens severe direct consequences for defendants whose 
vehicle-flight convictions would not have triggered ACCA in the past.38 
                                                     
31. __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
32. United States v. Rogers, 594 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 3018. 
33. See supra note 22. 
34. United States v. Sykes, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2272 (2011). 
35. See infra Part I.D. 
36. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2295 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
37. See 134 CONG. REC. 15,806–07 (1988) (statement of Sen. Specter) (describing ACCA’s 
purpose as “incarcerat[ing] unrehabilitative repeat violent felons for lengthy periods”). 
38. Before Sykes, the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had held certain vehicle-flight 
offenses were not violent felonies. United States v. Rivers, 595 F.3d 558, 565 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(violation of S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-750(A) not a violent felony); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 
722, 726 (8th Cir. 2009) (violation of MINN. STAT. § 609.487(3) not a violent felony); United States 
v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1290–96 (11th Cir. 2009) (violation of FLA. STAT. § 16.1935(2) not a 
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Further, Sykes’ effect would be felt even in cases where ACCA does not 
apply: unlike ACCA, which only directly affects sentences for unlawful 
firearm possession, the Career Offender sentencing provisions apply 
during sentences for “crime(s) of violence” or “controlled substance 
offense(s).”39 In 2009, convictions involving violence or drugs produced 
thirty-five percent of federal felony sentences.40 Because courts have 
directly applied U.S. Supreme Court holdings regarding ACCA’s 
residual provision when interpreting the similar residual provision of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guideline’s Career Offender provisions,41 Sykes’ 
holding may trigger Career Offender sentencing provisions in similar 
cases involving prior vehicle-flight convictions.42 
This Comment argues that Sykes should be read narrowly. Out of its 
hodge-podge of tests, only one—the Court’s holding that the vehicle-
flight statute’s structure reflected Indiana’s legislative judgment that 
vehicle flight poses inherent risks43—remains true to the categorical 
approach governing all ACCA interpretations. This holding extends only 
to the Indiana statute Sykes considered and those statutes exhibiting a 
similar legislative determination. Because the other methods present in 
Sykes raise the very concerns that spurred the U.S. Supreme Court to 
adopt the categorical approach in the first place,44 they should not be 
carried forward by courts considering vehicle flight for ACCA purposes 
in the future. Part I of this Comment discusses the substantive scope of 
the residual provision and the ambiguities that have developed from the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle to interpret that provision using a 
categorical approach. Part II argues that the holding in Sykes can be 
explained solely by features of Indiana’s vehicle-flight statute, and that 
the other apparent bases for the opinion cannot be squared with the 
categorical approach or the Court’s decision in Rogers. Accordingly, 
                                                     
violent felony); United States v. Jennings, 515 F.3d 980, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2007) (violation of 
WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.024 not a violent felony). 
39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (2011). 
40. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 13 (2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf (reporting 2365 violent felony 
convictions and 25,874 drug felony convictions out of a total 78,974 felony convictions). 
41. See supra note 22. 
42. Though lacking conclusive data, the International Association of Chiefs of Police suggests 
there may be roughly ten pursuits per year for every 100 officers. See CYNTHIA LUM & GEORGE 
FACHNER, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE PURSUIT IN AN AGE OF INNOVATION AND 
REFORM 55–56 (2008) (noting that this rate of pursuits per year per 100 officers appeared in their 
own data set, as well as in two previous statistical surveys). 
43. See infra text accompanying notes 230–242.  
44. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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only the part of the Sykes opinion resting on analysis of Indiana’s 
vehicle-flight statute should bind the lower courts. Finally, Part III 
assesses circuit court opinions since Sykes to see which agree and which 
conflict with this suggested reading. 
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S CONFUSING ACCA CASE-
LAW PRODUCES AN AMBIGUOUS HOLDING IN SYKES 
ACCA’s purpose is to target the career criminals that Congress had 
determined were disproportionately responsible for violent crime45—it 
aims to “bring the Federal Government into the fight against street 
crime”46 by punishing these recidivist criminals.47 “In order to determine 
which offenders fall into this category, the Act looks to past crimes.”48 
The trouble in interpreting ACCA arises from deciding which past 
crimes count towards identifying a career criminal.49 This Comment 
deals with the category of predicates falling into the residual provision 
of ACCA,50 under which the vehicle-flight offense in Sykes qualified. Of 
the various categories of ACCA predicate offenses, the residual 
provision presents the greatest interpretive difficulty.51 Deciding whether 
a particular offense qualifies as a violent felony under the residual 
provision involves two questions: (1) what substantive qualities 
distinguish residual-provision offenses, and (2) what information a court 
                                                     
45. See James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines: Moving Towards Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 545–46 (2009) (noting that 
ACCA arose from Congress’s “target[ing of] career criminals for punishment in light of social 
scientific research . . . concluding that a relatively small number of habitual offenders are 
responsible for a large fraction of crimes”). 
46. Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 4639 and H.R. 4768 Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 43 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 
House Judiciary Hearing] (statement of Sen. Specter) (explaining the goals of ACCA’s 1984 
enactment during its 1986 amendment). 
47. See Levine, supra note 45, at 548 (characterizing ACCA’s primary purpose as “incapacitating 
career criminals who are likely to re-offend and pose a danger to the public if not incarcerated”); see 
also infra notes 76–87 and accompanying text. 
48. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146 (2008). 
49. See Holman, supra note 22, at 212–13 (“The battle over the application of the ACCA is 
fought over whether a defendant’s three prior convictions fall within the meaning of ‘violent felony’ 
or ‘serious drug offense,’ therefore triggering the ACCA.”). 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). 
51. See Nijhawan v. Holder, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 (2009) (noting that the residual 
provision’s language “poses greater interpretive difficulty” than other ACCA predicate categories). 
Justice Scalia has excoriated the residual provision as “unintelligible” and characterized ACCA’s 
enactment on the whole as an abdication of congressional responsibility. James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192, 230–31 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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should consider in testing for those substantive qualities.52 The 
combination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s answers to those two 
questions has produced confusing case-law culminating in Sykes. 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Developed the Residual Provision’s 
Substantive Requirements Looking to Both the Legislative History 
and Text of ACCA 
The clause containing the residual provision—with the residual 
provision emphasized—includes as a violent felony a crime that “is 
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise 
involves conduct that presents a serious potential of physical injury to 
another.”53 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the residual 
provision as containing offenses similar to the four preceding 
enumerated offenses.54 But because these enumerated offenses have little 
in common with each other,55 the Court has also considered ACCA’s 
purpose as expressed by its legislative history. 
1. ACCA’s History Discloses Congress’s Concern as Identifying 
Career Criminals Likely to Pose a Future Threat 
ACCA’s direct effect is narrow, applying only during sentencing for 
illegal firearm possession.56 However, it indirectly reaches the wide 
range of conduct included under its predicate offenses. The scope and 
variety of these predicate offenses have steadily grown, linked mainly by 
the sense that they are “the kind of thing an armed career criminal would 
do.”57 Neither the offense ACCA directly penalizes nor the predicate 
offenses that trigger it have remained constant throughout its legislative 
history. 
Though now ACCA most directly targets illegal firearm possession, 
                                                     
52. Holman, supra note 22, at 217. 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (applies during sentencing under § 922(g)). 
54. E.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (“In our view, the provision’s listed 
examples—burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives—illustrate the 
kinds of crimes that fall within the statute’s scope.”). 
55. See Holman, supra note 22, at 217. Justice Scalia likened the enumerated offenses and 
residual provision to a list containing “fire-engine red, light pink, maroon, navy blue, or colors that 
otherwise involve shades of red.” James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
56. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 
57. See United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Begay, 553 U.S. 
at 145). 
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its first incarnation lacked any reference to that offense.58 ACCA started 
as the Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981, a “pure three-strikes 
recidivist statute”59 that would have made an individual’s third 
conviction for state law burglary or robbery into a federal offense 
punishable by life imprisonment without possibility of parole.60 Burglary 
and robbery functioned both as the predicates for this early incarnation 
of ACCA and the offenses to which its sentencing provisions would 
apply.61 
Congress switched ACCA’s target offense to illegal firearm 
possession after the initial bill stalled over concerns about prosecuting 
these quintessentially local crimes in federal court.62 When the bill was 
reintroduced during Congress’s next session,63 debate centered on these 
federalism concerns.64 At a hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, 
representatives from both the American Bar Association and the 
National District Attorneys Association “made basic federalism 
arguments” against federal prosecution of “local” robberies and 
burglaries.65 Federal officials also objected to a contemplated provision 
allowing state district attorneys to veto federal prosecution under the 
bill.66 
The Subcommittee addressed these concerns by adopting the Hughes 
                                                     
58. See S. 1688, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981); H.R. 6386, 97th Cong. (1982); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 98-1073, at 3–4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663–64 (briefly describing ACCA’s 
history in both houses of Congress). This first version applied to defendants who were charged with 
burglary or robbery and had two prior burglary or robbery convictions. Derrick D. Crago, Note, The 
Problem of Counting to Three Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1179, 1192 (1991). 
59. Holman, supra note 22, at 229 n.108. 
60. S. 1688, at § 2. 
61. Id. 
62. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 4 (noting the earlier bill raised “numerous questions” about 
“coordination procedures in any prosecution . . . and the extent of Federal criminal resources that 
might be required in the prosecutions”); Holman, supra note 22, at 229 n.108 (“The legislative 
history reveals only one clear purpose for the ‘armed’ aspect of the ACCA: the trigger for federal 
authority.”). As well as purely constitutional reasons, federalism also bore on political and practical 
considerations. See Levine, supra note 45, at 546–47 (“In fact, it appears that the only reason that 
the minimum fifteen-year sentence is mandated for illegally possessing firearms is that imposing the 
sentence on all career criminals regardless of whether they were convicted of violating a federal law 
(such as by illegally possessing a gun) was not a politically feasible option due to the 
aforementioned federalism concerns.”). 
63. H.R. 1627, 98th Cong. (1984). 
64. See Levine, supra note 45, at 546–47 (describing federalism concerns during the introduction 
and amendment of the 1984 bill). 
65. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 4. 
66. Id. 
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Amendment, which kept little of the proposed statute in place but the 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence.67 The Hughes Amendment 
proposed avoiding the issue of federalism by having ACCA directly 
apply only to an existing federal crime—illegal firearm possession.68 
Hughes relegated burglary and robbery, previously ACCA’s stars, to the 
role of predicate crimes.69 The Subcommittee’s discussion of the Hughes 
Amendment treated firearm possession mainly as a hook for federal 
jurisdiction.70 Even though this amendment radically restructured the 
legislation, it preserved what appears to be ACCA’s core feature: 
connecting career criminals with long sentences.71 Congress passed the 
amended bill as the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.72 
Robbery and burglary have also played shifting roles throughout 
ACCA’s development. The original 1981 bill would have allowed direct 
federal prosecution of these offenses;73 the 1984 Act used them as 
predicate offenses.74 In its current form ACCA no longer enumerates 
robbery.75 ACCA primarily reflected congressional concern with the 
small fraction of criminals thought to be the engine behind most of the 
violent crime in America76—one recidivism study published before 
ACCA’s enactment found that just six percent of men within an age-
cohort committed between sixty and eighty percent of all homicides, 
rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults perpetrated by its members.77 
                                                     
67. See id. (describing the Hughes Amendment’s proposed changes); Levine, supra note 45, at 
546–47 (noting that the Hughes Amendment “significantly changed the legislation”).  
68. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 4. 
69. Id. at 5; Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XVIII, sec. 1801–1803, 98 Stat. 1837, 2185 (1984). 
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 4–5; see also Holman, supra note 22, at 229 n.108 (“The 
criminal must first commit the three predicate violent felonies, qualifying as a career criminal. The 
subsequent possession of the firearm then ‘brings the Federal Government into the fight.’” (quoting 
1986 House Judicial Hearing, supra note 46, at 43)). 
71. “Under this approach, if the local authorities arrest a three-time loser in possession of a gun 
(in the course of a robbery or burglary or otherwise) . . . the mandatory 15-year penalty is available. 
In this manner, H.R. 6248 will be giving law enforcement officials another option in dealing with 
career criminals.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 5. 
72. 130 Cong. Rec. 28,096 (1984). 
73. H.R. 6386, 97th Cong. (1982). 
74. H.R. 1627, 98th Cong. (1984). 
75. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) (2006). Robbery still qualifies as a predicate if it requires as an 
element “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 
76. See Levine, supra note 45, at 545 (noting that ACCA resulted after Congress “began to target 
career criminals for punishment in light of social scientific research conducted in the 1970s and 
1980s concluding that a relatively small number of habitual offenders are responsible for a large 
fraction of crimes”). 
77. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 1 (citing MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, ROBERT M. FIGLIO & THORSTEN 
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Satisfied by this and similar studies that some minority of the criminal 
population produced a majority of crime, Congress set about 
determining how to identify this most dangerous segment.78 ACCA 
drafters settled on targeting robbers and burglars as reasonable proxies 
for career criminals.79 Throughout these amendments, ACCA’s focus 
remained “incarcerat[ing] unrehabilitative repeat violent felons for 
lengthy periods.”80 
Congress added the residual provision to ACCA with the Career 
Criminal Amendment Act of 198681 (1986 Amendment). Provoked by 
worries that ACCA’s predicates were too narrow,82 the 1986 
Amendment expanded the predicate offenses from robbery or burglary83 
to “a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both”84—essentially 
ACCA’s current form.85 The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the 1986 
Amendment only extended ACCA’s reach and did not alter its basic 
purpose of subjecting career criminals to lengthy sentences.86 Robbery, 
burglary, or any other specific crime served as markers to identify these 
“hardened criminals.”87 
                                                     
SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972)). 
78. See id. at 2–3. 
79. See id. at 3 (explaining how most burglaries and robberies are committed by career 
criminals). 
80. 134 CONG. REC. 15,806–07 (1988) (statement of Sen. Specter); accord H.R. REP. NO. 98-
1073, at 1 (“This bill is designed to increase the participation of the federal law enforcement system 
in efforts to curb armed, habitual (career) criminals.”). 
81. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-39, § 1402 (1986). 
82. See The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 6 (1986) (statement of David Dart Queen, 
Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (“But except for armed robbers and burglars, 
the same level of deterrence does not exist for other violent criminals or drug traffickers who have 
armed themselves to continue a proven career of crime.”); see also 1986 House Judiciary Hearing, 
supra note 46, at 44 (statement of Sen. Specter); id. at 19 (statement of James Knapp, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen.) (noting that ACCA had only been used eleven times in its first year). 
83. Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. XVIII, 98 Stat. 1837, 2185 (1984). 
84. H.R. REP. NO. 99-849, at 6 (1986). 
85. The only further change was a 1988 amendment specifying that predicate offenses must be 
committed on separate occasions. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988). 
86. “The goals of the 1986 ACCA amendments were the same as that of the original act: 
deterrence and incapacitation.” Sarah F. Russell, Rethinking Recidivist Enhancements: The Role of 
Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1135, 1178 (2010); see also 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 583 (1990) (“Similarly, during the House and Senate 
hearings on the bills, the witnesses reiterated the concerns that prompted the original enactment of 
the enhancement provision in 1984: the large proportion of crimes committed by a small number of 
career offenders, and the inadequacy of state prosecutorial resources to address this problem.”). 
87. 134 Cong. Rec. 15,807 (1988) (statement of Sen. Specter). 
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2. Residual-Provision Offenses Must Pose a Similar Risk of Injury 
and Present a Similar Level of Intent as the Enumerated Offenses 
The U.S. Supreme Court has identified two substantive requirements 
possessed by residual-provision offenses. The offense must pose a 
sufficient risk of physical injury to another, and also be of the right 
“kind.”88 The Court identified the risk requirement first, and has 
resolved most of its residual-provision cases on that basis.89 
The risk requirement arises from the interaction of ACCA’s residual 
provision and the enumerated offenses.90 The Court has read the 
“otherwise involves” language to require that the risk of physical injury 
of a residual-provision offense be similar to the risk level of the 
preceding enumerated offenses.91 The question of exactly how to make 
this comparison has proved problematic, because the enumerated 
offenses collectively make a poor yardstick for measuring risk.92 The 
Court has variously tried or suggested comparing an offense to its 
closest analogue among the enumerated examples,93 comparing the 
offense to the least risky enumerated offense,94 or a more free-form 
comparison asking only for “roughly similar” risk95 or commonality with 
only one or two of the enumerated offenses.96 
Like risk level, the “kind” inquiry also turns on similarity to the 
                                                     
88. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008). 
89. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275 (2011) (“The sole decision of 
this Court concerning the reach of ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the dispositive 
factor is Begay . . . .”). 
90. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203 (2007) (“The specific offenses enumerated in 
clause (ii) provide one baseline from which to measure whether other similar conduct 
‘otherwise . . . presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) 
(2006))). 
91. See, e.g., James, 550 U.S. at 203 (asking “whether the risk posed by attempted burglary is 
comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses”). 
92. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 142–43 (noting that the enumerated offenses “are so far from clear in 
respect to the degree of risk each poses that it is difficult to accept clarification in respect to degree 
of risk as Congress’s only reason for including them”); James, 550 U.S. at 229 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (remarking that the enumerated offenses share little in common, “most especially . . . the 
level of risk of physical injury they pose”). 
93. See James, 550 U.S. at 203. 
94. See id. at 219–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (proposing comparison to the least-risky enumerated 
offense—identified as burglary—as the test for the residual provision). 
95. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143 (limiting the residual provision to crimes “roughly similar, in kind 
as well as in degree of risk posed,” to the enumerated offenses). 
96. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011) (comparing vehicle 
flight’s risk to burglary and arson). 
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enumerated offense.97 Unlike the risk level requirement, the similar-kind 
limitation lacks a strict textual basis98 and instead reflects ACCA’s 
purpose of identifying and punishing career criminals.99 An offense is 
more likely to identify a career criminal,100 and thus properly serve as an 
ACCA predicate, if it shares the enumerated offenses’ characteristic 
“purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct.”101 Such conduct 
makes it “more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use 
that gun deliberately to harm a victim”—thus justifying ACCA’s harsher 
penalties for firearm possession.102 
“Purposeful, violent, and aggressive” has been pared down to a 
requirement of purposefulness.103 Initially, the test provoked confusion 
in the lower courts.104 Some focused on a willingness to inflict 
violence;105 others settled on challenges to authority.106 The Seventh 
Circuit interpreted Begay as imposing little more than a mens rea 
requirement107: in Begay Justice Breyer characterized the enumerated 
                                                     
97. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. 
98. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275 (remarking that the “kind” test, introduced in Begay, “is an 
addition to the statutory text” that “has no precise textual link to the residual clause”). 
99. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–47 (justifying the requirement as necessary to avoid sweeping in 
crimes “far removed . . . from the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of 
firearms,” thus contravening congressional intent); see also 1986 House Judiciary Hearing, supra 
note 46, at 26 (statement of Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. James Knapp) (“Obviously, we would not 
consider what I would call misdemeanor burglary, or your technical burglaries, or anything like 
that.”). 
100. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 145–46 (noting that ACCA looks to past crimes to determine which 
offenders should be subject to its penalty). 
101. Id. at 144–45 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part)). 
102. Id. at 145. 
103. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275–76 (characterizing Sykes’ argument that all ACCA predicates 
must be purposeful, violent, and aggressive as “overreading” Begay, and declining to apply Begay’s 
test beyond strict liability, negligence, or recklessness crimes). 
104. See Holman, supra note 22, at 211 (describing ACCA application after Begay as 
“whimsical”); Hayley A. Montgomery, Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 
Ailing Residual Provision, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 723–24 (2010). Montgomery excerpts a 
courtroom proceeding in which the district court judge accused the “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” test of “confus[ing] the entire issue, do[ing] a grave disservice to everybody like 
yourself and the defender’s office and everyone else who’s attempting to make sense out of their 
opinions and administer justice fairly to all.” Id. at 724 n.67 (quoting Transcript of Proceedings at 
15, United States v. Christensen, No. CR-04-267-EFS (E.D. Wash. Jul. 9, 2009)). 
105. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The fleeing 
crime . . . seems more appropriately characterized as the crime of a fleeing coward—not an armed 
career criminal bent on inflicting physical injury.”). 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 535 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that vehicle 
flight involves a “clear challenge” to police authority). 
107. See United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 592–96 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding “violent” and 
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offenses as variously involving entering a building with intent to commit 
a crime,108 causing a fire with the purpose of destroying a building,109 or 
purposefully obtaining another’s property by threat of force.110 
Explosives use also implicated intent—“the word ‘use’ . . . most 
naturally suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or merely 
accidental conduct.”111 In Sykes the U.S. Supreme Court essentially 
endorsed this approach.112 The requirement thus excludes crimes of mere 
negligence, recklessness, or strict liability.113 Further, any knowing or 
purposeful intent must be specific to the risk-posing conduct.114 
The U.S. Supreme Court has used no factors aside from risk level and 
intent to decide which offenses fit within the residual provision.115 
B. Under the Categorical Approach, the Statute and Elements 
Defining an Offense Determine if It Qualifies as an ACCA 
Predicate 
In its first case considering ACCA, years before taking up the residual 
provision, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a categorical approach that 
limited the information a court could consider when determining 
whether a specific crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense. Taylor 
v. United States116 required the Court to decide whether a Missouri 
burglary conviction counted as a violent felony within the meaning of 
ACCA. The Court held that a single, nation-wide standard should define 
                                                     
“aggressive” satisfied by conduct only presenting the possibility of violence); Holman, supra note 
22, at 257 (noting that Dismuke reduced the test to one of purposefulness). 
108. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575, 598 (1990)) (emphasis added). 
109. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1) (1985)) (emphasis added). 
110. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
111. Id. (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)). 
112. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (“Begay [excluded from the 
residual provision] a crime akin to strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes; and the 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive formulation was used in that case to explain the result.”). But see 
Begay, 553 U.S. at 152 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that explosives use includes crimes of 
negligence and recklessness) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.2(2)); Holman, supra note 22, at 
258–61(arguing Begay should exclude only strict liability crimes). 
113. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275–76; id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
majority’s narrowing of Begay as “the ‘purposeful’ test”). 
114. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 145–46 (rejecting the argument that “the knowing nature of the 
conduct that produces intoxication” leading to a drunken-driving conviction suffices to display the 
element of intent). 
115. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275 (noting that risk level decided every U.S. Supreme Court 
residual-provision case except Begay, in which mens rea proved dispositive). 
116. 495 U.S. 575 (1989). 
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“burglary” for ACCA purposes, instead of determining the scope of the 
federal statute by reference to state statutes or common law.117 As the 
Court observed, relying on state statutory or common-law definitions 
would produce inconsistent punishment for the same conduct undertaken 
in different places.118 A single federal definition would keep offenders 
from “invoking the arcane technicalities of the common-law definition” 
and prevent the “unfairness of having enhancement depend upon the 
label employed by the State of conviction.”119 Because ACCA failed to 
supply its own burglary definition,120 the Court crafted its own—a 
generic burglary statute with the element of “unlawful or unprivileged 
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit 
a crime.”121 The Court remanded the case, instructing the sentencing 
court to determine whether Taylor had been convicted of a state offense 
satisfying the requirements of the generic statute using the categorical 
approach.122 The generic burglary statute would thus be used to take the 
measure of Taylor’s statute of conviction, rather than his offense 
conduct.123 
Courts applying the categorical approach determine whether 
conviction for a particular crime qualifies as a predicate across the 
board, regardless of the facts surrounding an individual defendant’s 
commission of that crime.124 The categorical approach generally limits 
the trial court to looking at the existence of a conviction and the 
elements of its crime.125 These elements largely spring from the statute 
defining the crime,126 but may also include additional court-imposed 
requirements for conviction.127 The events surrounding the particular 
                                                     
117. Id. at 590–94, 598. 
118. Id. at 591–96. 
119. Id. at 589. 
120. ACCA’s 1984 version had included a definition of burglary, which was removed by the 
1986 Amendment in what the Court termed “an inadvertent casualty of a complex drafting process.” 
Id. at 589–90. 
121. Id. at 598–99. The Court based its generic burglary definition on Model Penal Code’s 
definition. Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1 (1980)). 
122. Id. at 599–602. 
123. Id.; see also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (noting that under the 
categorical approach “we . . . do not generally consider the ‘particular facts disclosed by the record 
of conviction’”) (quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005))). 
124. See James, 550 U.S. at 202. 
125. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
126. Id. 
127. E.g., Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2271 (considering, among the 
statutory elements of vehicle flight, the Indiana Court of Appeals’ mens rea requirement) (citing 
Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002))). 
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occurrence of a crime generally have no place in the categorical 
analysis.128 
Because the categorical approach considers the sufficiency of statutes 
as ACCA predicates instead of individual conduct, it does not 
necessarily treat similar conduct identically—absolute regularity in 
application gives way to “the prerogatives of the States in defining their 
own offenses.”129 For example, when Taylor was convicted for burglary, 
not all Missouri statutes describing that crime included every element of 
ACCA’s generic burglary.130 If Taylor had been convicted under one of 
these looser statutes—the record before the Court was unclear131—then 
the conviction would not count as an ACCA predicate, regardless of 
whether the same conduct could also have supported a conviction under 
a statute that did meet the generic offense’s requirements.132 The same 
would hold true for convictions under other states’ burglary statutes that 
“define burglary more broadly,” for instance by failing to require that the 
entry be unlawful, or allowing the burgled place to be something other 
than a building.133 
The Taylor Court warned that pursuing a fact-based, rather than 
categorical, approach would conflict with ACCA’s language and 
legislative history and raise serious practical and fairness concerns.134 A 
conviction, especially a guilty plea, might provide little or no record for 
a sentencing court to determine the facts of the offense.135 Further, 
enhancing a sentence based on such facts when a defendant had pleaded 
to a lesser offense seems unjust.136 The Court found these reasons for 
adopting the categorical approach persuasive—and noted that every 
circuit interpreting ACCA had done likewise.137 In Shepard v. United 
                                                     
128. James, 550 U.S. at 202; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–602. 
129. See S. REP NO. 98-190, at 20 (1983) (describing Congress’s reasons for adopting a single 
federal definition of burglary in the 1984 ACCA). 
130. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578 n.1, 602. 
131. Id. at 602. 
132. Id. at 599–600; see also James, 550 U.S. at 197 (considering a Florida burglary statute that 
failed to satisfy ACCA’s generic definition). 
133. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
134. Id. at 601–02. 
135. Id. 
136. Id.; see also United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 964–66 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(Berzon, J., dissenting) (“Not only is this unfair, but it will undoubtedly discourage defendants from 
pleading guilty. What good is a bargain that a later court might rewrite?”); Holman, supra note 22, 
at 218 n.49 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the restriction on judicial fact-finding for 
sentencing purposes since Taylor.”). 
137. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02. 
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States138 the Court added a constitutional buttress to the categorical 
approach, noting that enhancing a sentence based on facts neither found 
by a jury nor admitted by a defendant risked offending the Sixth 
Amendment.139 The categorical approach has applied to the entirety of 
ACCA ever since.140 
A look at the “modified categorical approach” underscores the formal 
categorical inquiry’s rigor. Under the modified categorical approach a 
court may look beyond a crime’s statutory elements only when 
confronted with a statute describing several distinct crimes.141 As 
discussed above, burglary for ACCA purposes requires illegal entry into 
a building.142 A court considering a statute criminalizing “breaking into a 
‘building, ship, vessel or vehicle’” will consequently need to know under 
which prong a conviction lies to determine whether it is a violent 
felony.143 In only these cases, a court may look to a short list of 
documents—the indictment, charging information, jury instructions, or 
the terms of a plea agreement or colloquy establishing the factual basis 
for a plea—to determine which prong of a statute separately describing 
more than one offense was violated.144 Beyond facts actually required to 
support the conviction, how the defendant allegedly perpetrated the 
crime remains irrelevant under the modified categorical approach.145 
Beyond supplementing the usual inquiry with a narrowly circumscribed 
list of documents when dealing with a particular subset of statute, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has permitted no other exception to the categorical 
approach. 
                                                     
138. 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
139. Id. at 24–26 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
140. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (“We think the only plausible interpretation of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) 
is that, like the rest of the enhancement statute, it generally requires the trial court to look only to the 
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”). 
141. Nijhawan v. Holder, __U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009). The various crimes must be 
“described separately.” Id. But see Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917 (applying the modified 
categorical approach beyond such divisible statutes, to statutes missing an element of a generic 
crime).  
142. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598–99. 
143. See Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 266, § 16 (West 2006) as 
an example). 
144. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. However, the categorical approach “may 
permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases 
where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
602. 
145. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
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C. Each Pre-Sykes Residual-Provision Case Applies the Categorical 
Approach Differently in Determining Risk Level and Intent 
Leading up to Sykes, the U.S. Supreme Court examined the residual 
provision in James v. United States,146 Begay v. United States,147 and 
Chambers v. United States.148 Though answering the same questions in 
each case (whether a particular offense involved the requisite risk level 
and intent to qualify as an ACCA predicate offense) and using the same 
method (the categorical approach), these cases have relied on very 
different analyses in making their categorical determinations.149 
1. The Court Determined Risk Level Based on the “Ordinary Case” 
of the Offense in James 
James called on the U.S. Supreme Court to interpret the residual 
provision for the first time.150 James, like Taylor, involved burglary, but 
added two significant wrinkles: the conviction in question was for 
attempted burglary151 and the Florida statute of conviction152 
unquestionably failed to satisfy the elements of the generic offense.153 
The Court’s opinion turned on whether attempted burglary presented a 
sufficient risk of injury.154 Consistent with Taylor, the Court applied the 
categorical approach.155 
The Court first held that the residual provision included attempt 
crimes.156 According to the majority, narrowly reading the residual 
provision to exclude attempt crimes would be inconsistent with its broad 
catch-all function.157 Moreover, the specific enumerated offense of 
explosives use included inchoate crimes—“[a]n unsuccessful attempt to 
                                                     
146. 550 U.S. 192 (2007). 
147. 553 U.S. 137 (2008). 
148. 555 U.S. 122 (2009). 
149. See Holman, supra note 22, at 219 (“The categorical approach’s relative simplicity does not 
appear to have survived its application to the residual clause.”); see also Sykes v. United States, 
__U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2285 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disparaging the majority’s use of 
various methods from earlier cases as a “tutti-frutti opinion”). 
150. See James, 550 U.S. at 198. 
151. Id. at 195–96. 
152. FLA. STAT. §§ 777.04, 810.02 (1993). 
153. James, 550 U.S. at 197. 
154. Id. at 203. 
155. Id. at 202. 
156. Id. at 199–201. 
157. Id. at 198–99. 
16 - WLR March 2012 Reavis Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:20 AM 
2012] VEHICLE FLIGHT AND ACCA 299 
 
blow up a government building, for example.”158 Finally, Congress’s 
intent that ACCA apply broadly, as expressed during the 1986 
amendment process, supported inclusion of attempt crimes.159 
Accordingly, the Court rejected James’ argument that the enumerated 
offenses contained only complete crimes and concomitant proposal that 
the residual provision should follow suit.160 
After disposing of this preliminary question, the Court turned to the 
meat of the case: deciding whether attempted burglary fit into the 
residual provision. To answer, the Court asked whether attempted 
burglary poses a sufficient danger of physical injury to qualify as a 
violent felony.161 
Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, answered in the 
affirmative by comparing attempted burglary to its closest analog among 
the enumerated offenses—burglary.162 Though attempted burglary does 
not require successful entry into a building,163 an element of the 
enumerated offense,164 both present the same “possibility of a face-to-
face confrontation between the burglar and a third party.”165 And 
because the residual provision requires only potential risk of injury,166 it 
might include attempted burglary even if in some cases the crime could 
be committed without actual risk.167 Justice Alito’s application of the 
categorical approach asked only “whether the conduct encompassed by 
the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious 
potential risk of injury to another.”168 He reasoned that the “ordinary 
case” of attempted burglary involves an interrupted burglary, which 
presents the possibility of a violent conflict.169 In this sense, the attempt 
crime posed, if anything, a greater risk of injury than the completed 
crime—a successful burglar might, after all, slip back into the night 
                                                     
158. Id. at 199 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(f)(1) (2000)). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 199–200. 
161. Id. at 203. 
162. Id. at 204–10. 
163. See FLA. STAT. § 777.04(1) (1993) (describing attempt crimes under Florida law).  
164. James, 550 U.S. at 197 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)). 
165. Id. at 203–04. 
166. See id. at 207 (“[The] residual provision speaks in terms of a ‘potential risk.’ These are 
inherently probabilistic concepts.” (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (7th ed. 1999))). 
167. Id. at 208–09. 
168. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). 
169. Id. at 203–04. 
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without further incident.170 Thus, attempted burglary “by its nature” 
presents the requisite risk to qualify as a predicate offense under the 
residual provision.171 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion drew a trenchant dissent from Justice 
Antonin Scalia, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg.172 Justice Scalia argued for comparing a crime to the least 
risky of the enumerated offenses instead of its closest enumerated 
cousin.173 Not every potential violent felony would pair so naturally as 
attempted burglary with burglary; the majority’s approach “[got] the 
case off [the] docket, sure enough,” but offered little guidance for the 
future.174 He also disagreed with the majority regarding the relative risks 
of burglary and attempted burglary, suggesting that, by definition, a 
mere attempted burglar never could have entered the building.175 The 
dissenting Justices agreed with the majority on two key points, though: 
that risk level governed the case’s outcome, and that the proper way to 
determine that risk level was to imagine the ordinary occurrence of a 
crime.176 
2. The Court Determined Intent Looking Only to the Elements of the 
Offense in Begay 
In Begay,177 the Court focused on a different dispositive issue than it 
did in James, and also used a different flavor of categorical approach. 
Begay involved a New Mexico conviction for driving under the 
influence (DUI).178 New Mexico made DUI a felony after three previous 
DUI convictions,179 and Larry Begay had collected a dozen before police 
arrested him for threatening his aunt and sister with a rifle.180 Begay’s 
                                                     
170. See id. at 204 (“Many completed burglaries do not involve such confrontations.”). 
171. Id. at 209. 
172. Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia suggested, as an alternative to the method applied in 
his concurrence, voiding the residual provision for vagueness. Id. at 229–30. Justice Clarence 
Thomas also dissented, on grounds that ACCA impermissibly allowed sentencing based on facts not 
found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Id. at 231 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
173. Id. at 219. 
174. Id. at 215. 
175. Id. at 227. 
176.  Id. at 211 (majority opinon) (“In the end, Justice Scalia’s analysis of this case turns on the 
same question as ours—i.e., the comparative risks presented by burglary and attempted burglary.”). 
177. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).  
178. Id. at 140. 
179. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-102(G)–(J) (West 2007). 
180. Begay, 553 U.S. at 140. 
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prior felony DUIs subjected him to federal prosecution as a felon in 
possession of a firearm.181 Did the DUIs also suffice to trigger ACCA’s 
sentence enhancements? 
The Court passed quickly over the risk-level question crucial to 
James.182 Based on statistics by the National Highway Safety 
Administration and the lower court’s opinion, the Court assumed that 
DUI presented a level of risk sufficient to qualify under the residual 
provision.183 Risk level failed to decide the case, though, because the 
residual provision demanded an additional element: not only must a 
crime pose a risk similar to the enumerated offenses, it also had to be a 
similar type of crime.184 James never considered the type of crime in 
taking the measure of attempted burglary, because the type-of-crime fit 
was never in doubt—Congress emblazoned “burglary” across ACCA at 
nearly every phase of the legislative process.185 New Mexico’s felony 
DUI struck the Court as categorically different from the sort of crime 
targeted by ACCA; unlike the enumerated offenses, DUI did not 
“typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”186 Risk 
level notwithstanding, this difference set DUI outside the residual 
provision.187 
This focus on intent instead of risk level marked a departure from 
James. Additionally, the Begay Court focused on a typical statute, 
instead of the typical commission of the crime at issue, to determine 
whether the offense qualified as an ACCA predicate. Instead of looking 
to the way a DUI offense is ordinarily committed, the Court looked to 
the ordinary DUI statute: “statutes that forbid driving under the 
influence, such as the statute before us, typically do not insist on 
purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct . . . .”188 The U.S. Supreme 
Court had previously held that DUIs need neither be purposeful nor 
deliberate189—they more closely resembled strict-liability offenses.190 As 
                                                     
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). 
182. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141–42. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 143. 
185. See supra Part I.A.I. 
186. Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45 (internal quotes omitted). 
187. See id. at 142–45 (holding that after “read[ing] the examples as limiting the crimes that 
clause (ii) covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the 
examples themselves. . . . DUI differs from the example crimes . . . in at least one pertinent, and 
important, respect”—purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct). 
188. Id. 
189. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). 
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a categorical matter, New Mexico’s felony DUI possessed the risk level, 
but lacked the intent, necessary to qualify for the residual provision.191 
3. The Court Determined Risk Level Looking to Statistics in 
Chambers 
In Chambers,192 the Court answered “no” to both the risk level and 
intent inquiries when considering whether a conviction under Illinois 
law for failing to report to a penal institution193 constitutes an ACCA 
predicate offense.194 The entire Court joined or concurred with Justice 
Breyer’s majority opinion, making it the only U.S. Supreme Court 
residual-provision case with no dissenters.195 As Deondry Chambers had 
been convicted under a statute containing several distinct offenses—
some resembling violent felonies more closely than others196—the case 
also marked the first residual-provision application of the modified 
categorical approach to determine which prong produced the 
conviction.197 
The Chambers Court held that failing to report flunked both the 
residual-provision requirements of risk level and intent.198 As a 
categorical matter, looking only at the elements of the crime appears 
decisive: as a “form of inaction,” failure to report involves no 
affirmative conduct or intent requirements.199 Indeed, the Court held the 
crime “a far cry from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” 
evidencing the requisite intent under ACCA.200 
The Court also cited statistics showing that failure to report poses 
little or no risk of injury.201 Countering three examples given by the 
government where truant convicts shot at officers attempting recapture, 
Justice Breyer turned to a U.S. Sentencing Commission report that found 
                                                     
190. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 145 (describing DUI as “most nearly comparable to[]crimes that 
impose strict liability”). 
191. Id. at 147–48. 
192. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009). 
193. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
194. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 130. 
195. Id. at 123. Justice Thomas joined Justice Alito’s concurrence. Id. 
196. The statute prohibited conduct ranging from failing to abide by conditions of home release 
to breaking out of jail. Ch. 720, § 5/31-6(a); see also Chambers, 555 U.S. at 126. 
197. See supra notes 141–145 and accompanying text. 
198. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 130. 
199. Id. at 128–29. 
200. Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
201. Id. at 128–29. 
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no instances of violence within the 160 instances of failure to report in 
its sample.202 The report provided a “conclusive, negative answer” to the 
question of whether a failure-to-report offender categorically poses a 
serious potential risk of physical injury.203 Justice Breyer reproduced the 
data in its entirety and devoted nearly half of the Chambers majority 
opinion to discussing it.204 Chambers thus suggests that statistics furnish 
a distinct basis for categorically determining risk level.205 
D. The Sykes Court Failed to Specify on Which of Several Potentially 
Decisive Tests It Rests 
Sykes held that an Indiana vehicle-flight crime presents both the intent 
and risk of injury demanded by ACCA’s residual provision.206 The state 
statute’s “stringent mens rea requirement” of a knowing attempt to flee 
satisfies the requisite level of intent.207 To demonstrated risk of injury, 
the Court looked to the danger posed by the usual characteristics of 
vehicular flight crimes208 and national statistical data evincing the 
fatalities and injuries vehicle flight causes.209 The Court also determined 
that the vehicle-flight statute itself supported the offense’s categorically 
high risk level.210 Because Indiana had set the offense’s penalty equal to 
that of another explicitly risky offense in the same statute, the Court 
reasoned, the state had implicitly determined that the vehicle-flight 
offense considered poses an inherent danger.211 Sykes is first among the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s residual provision cases to employ this third 
                                                     
202. Id. at 129 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON FEDERAL ESCAPE OFFENSES IN 
FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007, at 6 (2008)). 
203. Id. 
204. The text of Chambers’ majority opinion spans pages 123 through 131 of the U.S. Reporter; 
the last three of these nine (129 to 31) discuss and reprint the Sentencing Commission’s data. See id. 
at 123–31. 
205. See Holman, supra note 22, at 223–24 (noting that Chambers seemed to hold out a court’s 
own statistical inquiry as an independent test for determining a violent felony). 
206. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (2011) (holding that vehicle 
flight satisfies the text of the residual provision because it “is not a strict liability, negligence, or 
recklessness crime and because it is, for the reasons stated and as a categorical matter, similar in risk 
to the listed crimes”). 
207. Id. at 2275 (citing IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a) (1998); Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 
901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 
208. Id. at 2273–74. 
209. Id. at 2274–75. 
210. Id. at 2276. 
211. Id. The Court inferred this legislative determination of the two offenses’ relationship 
because of “similarities in punishment for these related, overlapping offenses.” Id. (quoting id. at 
2282 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
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method of determining an offense’s risk level through statutory analysis. 
The two other inquiries—looking to the typical occurrence of the crime 
and statistics—appeared in earlier residual-provision cases and decided 
the issue of risk.212 In Sykes, it is unclear what weight they carry. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion opens with a lengthy 
quote invoking and explaining the categorical approach.213 Adding his 
own emphasis to James’ language, he wrote, “Under this 
approach . . . . we consider whether the elements of the offense are of the 
type that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision.”214 
Similar to the typical occurrence, or “ordinary case,” approach used 
first in James,215 Justice Kennedy then compared the risks attending 
vehicle flight to those of various enumerated offenses.216 Vehicle flight 
equals or exceeds the risk presented by burglary because both “can end 
in confrontation leading to violence.”217 For vehicle flight this risk arises 
because “a typical case” requires police to give chase and “escalate their 
response to ensure the felon is apprehended.”218 Vehicle flight’s risk is 
also comparable to that of arson because it involves indifference to 
possible collateral consequences—again, resulting from “the possibility 
that police will . . . exceed or almost match his speed or use force to 
bring him within their custody.”219 Although the “ordinary case” 
comparison decided James, it only opens the inquiry in Sykes. Vehicle 
flight’s similarity to arson in terms of risk level supplied only “a 
beginning point in establishing that vehicle flight presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another.”220 Comparison to the risk 
posed by burglary was only “[a]nother consideration”221 in the 
determination. 
                                                     
212. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 (2009) (noting that a report showing no 
violence in two years of failure-to-report cases “strongly supports the intuitive belief that failure to 
report does not involve a serious potential risk of physical injury”); Begay v. United States, 553 
U.S. 137, 141–42 (2008) (assuming DUI presents sufficient risk while citing only National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration data on alcohol-related fatalities); James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192, 208–09 (2007) (holding the ordinary case of an attempted robbery sufficed to decide 
issue of risk).  
213. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2272. 
214. Id. (quoting James, 550 U.S. at 202). 
215. James, 550 U.S. at 208. 
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Statistical evidence of vehicle flight’s dangers, similar to that 
presented in Chambers,222 also failed to decide Sykes.223 Sykes cites 
studies demonstrating the respective dangers of vehicle flight, burglary, 
and arson, suggesting that vehicle flight presents the greatest danger of 
the three.224 Whereas only 3.3 injuries result from every 100 arsons,225 
and 3.2 injuries from the same number of burglaries,226 every 100 fleeing 
vehicles produce 4 injuries—even excluding injuries to suspects.227 
However empirically damning, though, these numbers only “confirm the 
commonsense conclusion that Indiana’s vehicular flight crime is a 
violent felony.”228 By themselves they were “not dispositive.”229 
In the last section of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy turned to 
the structure of Indiana’s vehicle-flight statute. The Indiana statute, 
superseded by the time the Supreme Court considered it,230 possessed a 
curious structure that Sykes argued evinced a lack of categorical risk.231 
Subsection (a) described three offenses: resisting or obstructing an 
officer, obstructing legal process or a court order, or fleeing from an 
officer “after the officer has, by visible or audible means, identified 
himself and ordered the person to stop.”232 Subsection (b) classified 
                                                     
222. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129–31 (2009). 
223. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274 (noting that statistics are not dispositive of the issue of risk 
level). 
224. Id. at 2274–75 (noting that the “risks [posed by vehicle flight] may outstrip the dangers of at 
least two [enumerated offenses]” before discussing statistical risks associated with burglary and 
arson). The ensuing discussion borrows from a lengthier statistical exegesis in Justice Thomas’ 
concurrence. See id. at 2279–80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
225. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274–75 (citing U.S. FIRE ADMIN., METHODOLOGY USED IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOPICAL FIRE RESEARCH SERIES, available at 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/methodology.pdf; U.S. FIRE ADMIN., 2010 
NONRESIDENTIAL BUILDING INTENTIONAL FIRE TRENDS (2011), available at 
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/nonres_bldg_intentional_fire_trends.pdf; U.S. 
FIRE ADMIN., RESIDENTIAL BUILDING CAUSES, 
http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/xls/estimates/res_bldg_fire_cause.xlsx (last visited Jan. 6, 
2012); U.S. FIRE ADMIN. RESIDENTIAL AND NONRESIDENTIAL FIRE ESTIMATE SUMMARIES, 2003–
2009, http://www.usfa.fema.gov/statistics/estimates/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012)). 
226. Id. at 2274 (citing SHANNAN CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMIZATION 
DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (2010), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vdhb.pdf). 
227. Id. (citing LUM & FACHNER, supra note 42, at 54). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. A 2006 amendment, 2006 Ind. Acts 2470, established different punishments for vehicle 
flight requiring risk and simple vehicle flight. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2295 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(noting amendment). 
231. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276. 
232. IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a)(3) (1998). 
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these offenses for punishment purposes as either Class A misdemeanors 
or Class D, C, or B felonies.233 Two paths lead to a Class D felony: 
either (1) committing any of the three subsection (a) offenses by using a 
deadly weapon, injuring another person, or “operat[ing] a vehicle in a 
manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person”;234 or (2) committing the subsection (a) offense of fleeing an 
officer using a vehicle.235 The first statutory route to a Class D Felony 
conviction for vehicle flight thus required operating a vehicle 
dangerously. The second route—under which Sykes was convicted—did 
not.236 Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Justice Ginsburg in dissent, 
characterized these two forms of the offense respectively as aggravated 
and simple vehicle flight.237 
Sykes argued that because one method of charging vehicle flight 
expressly required risk of injury while the other did not, Indiana’s 
legislature must have intended only the first category to proscribe an 
ACCA-worthy offense.238 In response, Justice Kennedy pointed out that 
Indiana punished both equally.239 He reasoned that the statutory 
framework reflected the Indiana legislature’s judgment that “some 
offenses in subsection (a) can be committed without a vehicle or without 
creating substantial risks. [It] reflect[s] the further judgment that this is 
not so for vehicle flights.”240 By punishing the two subsections equally, 
the statute made simple vehicle flight the “rough equivalent” of 
aggravated vehicle flight241—the latter described in language nearly 
mirroring the residual provision itself.242 
Justice Kagan’s dissent differs from the majority’s analysis in two 
respects. First, she would have applied Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” test in all residual provision inquiries, not just those lacking 
a mens rea component.243 She illustrated the test by applying it to two 
                                                     
233. Id. § 35-44-3-3(b). 
234. Id. § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(B). 
235. Id. § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A). 
236. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2272. 
237. Id. at 2289–90 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 




242. Compare IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(B) (1998) (prohibition on resisting law enforcement 
while operating a vehicle “in a manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person”), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (residual provision “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”). 
243. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2289 & n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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hypothetical statutes, one prohibiting fleeing by “driving at high speed 
or otherwise demonstrating reckless disregard for the safety of 
others,”244 and the other banning only non-risky failure to stop.245 
Second, Justice Kagan agreed with petitioner’s interpretation based on 
the statutory framework.246 The statute at issue criminalizes a spectrum 
of conduct, ranging from “flight resulting in death” to “flight resulting in 
physical injury,” then “flight creating a substantial risk of physical 
injury,” on down to “flight.”247 According to Justice Kagan, “[t]hat last 
category—flight—almost screams to have the word ‘mere’ placed before 
it.”248 “To count [each] as ACCA offenses is to pay insufficient heed to 
the way the Indiana Legislature drafted its statute—as a series of 
escalating offenses, ranging from the simple to the most aggravated.”249 
Sykes thus provides three bases supporting its determination that 
vehicle flight poses a serious potential risk of injury to another, without 
indicating which is dispositive: an “ordinary case” analysis, statistics, 
and statutory analysis. The Sykes Court did not spell out which basis, or 
combination thereof, controls the outcome. 
E. Immediately After Sykes the U.S. Supreme Court Vacated and 
Remanded a Lower Court’s Determination That Vehicle Flight is 
the Practical Equivalent of a Violent Felony 
Rogers v. United States,250 handed down eleven days after Sykes, 
provides one last data point regarding the U.S. Supreme Court’s view of 
the relationship between vehicle flight and ACCA. In Rogers, the Court 
reviewed a Sixth Circuit holding that James Rogers’ Tennessee vehicle-
flight conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” as defined in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual.251 As discussed, courts treat the terms 
“crime of violence” and “violent felony” interchangeably.252 
The Tennessee statute at issue made it a crime to “intentionally flee or 
attempt to elude any law enforcement officer, after having received any 
                                                     
244. Id. at 2289. 
245. Id. at 2290. 
246. Id. at 2290–92. 
247. Id. at 2292–93. 
248. Id. at 2293. 
249. Id. 
250. __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
251. United States v. Rogers, 594 F.3d 517, 520–21 (6th Cir. 2010). 
252. See supra note 22. 
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signal from the officer to bring the vehicle to a stop.’’253 Consistent with 
its holding in United States v. Young,254 which considered a similarly 
worded Michigan statute, the Sixth Circuit held that Rogers’ conviction 
involved “purposeful, aggressive, and violent conduct,” and posed “a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to others.”255 Because fleeing 
“nearly always pose[s] a substantial danger to . . . pursuing officers,’’256 
it qualified as a crime of violence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ 
residual provision. The Sixth Circuit’s holding rested on boilerplate 
language out of Begay and the residual provision itself,257 and employed 
a rationale echoed in Sykes—that officer pursuit typically accompanying 
vehicle flight “nearly always” places others in danger.258 
In its entirety, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion reads: “Judgment 
vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Sykes v. United 
States[.]”259 This result is entirely congruent with a narrow reading of 
Sykes but inexplicable under a broad reading. 
II. SYKES CAN—AND SHOULD—BE READ NARROWLY 
Sykes lends itself to two readings—one narrow and one broad—
depending on which rationale offered by the Court met the residual 
provision’s requirement that vehicle flight pose a sufficient risk of 
injury. The risk-level determination may have rested primarily on the 
equivalent punishment shared by the vehicle-flight conviction 
considered in Sykes and Indiana’s other, explicitly risky, flight 
offense.260 If so, Sykes has little to say about vehicle-flight convictions 
from other states without a similar statutory feature. On the other hand, 
                                                     
253. Rogers, 594 F.3d at 520–21 (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-603(b)(1) (1995)). 
254. 580 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 2009). 
255. Rogers, 594 F.3d at 521 (quoting Young, 580 F.3d at 377–78). 
256. Id. (quoting Young, 580 F.3d at 378). 
257. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (“. . . or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”), and Begay v. United States, 553 
U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (“The listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive conduct.” (internal quotations omitted)), with Rogers, 594 F.3d at 521 (requiring 
“purposeful, aggressive, and violent conduct” and “a serious potential risk of physical harm to 
others” of a would-be violent felony (quoting Young, 580 F.3d at 377–78)). 
258. Rogers, 594 F.3d at 521; accord Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273–74 
(2011) (explaining that vehicle flight’s risks arise from police officers’ attempts to seize the 
offender). 
259. Rogers v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). The opinion also includes a grant 
of certiorari and leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Id. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 230–242. 
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as in James and Chambers, the risk level determination may have rested 
respectively on an ordinary case261 or statistical inquiry.262 These 
rationales apply with equal force no matter how a state chooses to define 
the offense. Because these bases for determining risk level do not stop at 
state lines, read this way Sykes would sweep all vehicle-flight 
convictions (with the right mens rea component) under the residual 
provision. Justice Kennedy used broad language that seems to support 
this reading,263 and the circuit courts seem poised to adopt it.264 
Sykes should instead be read narrowly, as turning only on Indiana’s 
statutory language. District and circuit courts considering vehicle-flight 
convictions as potential ACCA predicates should disregard statistics and 
ordinary case inquiries as inconsistent with the categorical approach 
mandated in Taylor. Instead, a vehicle-flight conviction should qualify 
as an ACCA predicate under the residual provision only if the statute 
defining the crime requires an element of risk or—similar to the Indiana 
statute considered in Sykes—expresses a legislative determination that 
the offense is inherently risky. James, Chambers, and to an extent Begay 
strayed from the categorical approach by necessity, because the statutes 
defining the offenses considered in those cases offered no statutory basis 
for categorically determining risk.265 Thus, the tests Sykes borrows from 
these cases also stray outside the categorical approach’s permitted 
boundaries.266 Under the narrow reading suggested, Sykes is the first 
residual-provision case in which the U.S. Supreme Court cleaves to the 
categorical approach as defined in Taylor.267 This narrow reading also 
explains—as the broad reading cannot—the summary remand of 
Rogers.268 
A. Case-by-Case Necessity Forced the Court to Stray from the 
Categorical Approach in James, Chambers, and Begay 
The practicalities of applying the residual provision have left the U.S. 
                                                     
261. See supra Part I.C.1. 
262. See supra Part I.C.3. 
263. See, e.g., Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2274 (“Risk of violence is inherent to vehicle flight.”). 
264. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text; infra Part III. 
265. See FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (West Supp. 2008); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 66-8-102(G)–(J) (West 2007). 
266. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2286 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In sum, our statistical analysis in 
ACCA cases is untested judicial factfinding masquerading as statutory interpretation.”). 
267. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (describing the categorical approach 
as looking only to the fact of conviction and statutory elements of the crime). 
268. Rogers v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
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Supreme Court in a difficult position. After adopting the categorical 
approach in Taylor for sound reasons of congressional intent, 
practicality, and basic fairness,269 the Court has never suggested 
abandoning it. Yet the crimes considered in James, Chambers, and 
Begay contained no plausible statutory basis for categorically 
determining whether each fits within the residual provision. 
James and Chambers both turn on determining the risk of harm to 
others.270 The statute at issue in James defined burglary as “entering or 
remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an 
offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or 
the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain.”271 The relevant 
part of Chambers’ failure-to-report statute criminalized “knowingly 
fail[ing] to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic 
imprisonment at any time.”272 Neither statute addresses the degree of 
risk posed by the prohibited action. James held that attempted burglary 
posed a serious risk273 and Chambers held that failure to report did 
not,274 but the elements of the crimes—all the Court should have looked 
to under the categorical approach275—provide no basis for this 
distinction. Given how clearly Congress considered burglars as likely 
career criminals, it seems consistent with ACCA’s purpose that its 
sentencing provisions should also apply to attempted burglars.276 
Likewise, holding that “a form of inaction,” as the Court characterized 
failure to report, counts as a violent felony would seem perverse.277 
Begay also reaches its determination looking to elements beyond “the 
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.”278 
Rather than degree of risk, Begay turned on whether a crime requires a 
suitably violent mental state.279 Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and 
                                                     
269. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02; see also supra notes 134–140 and accompanying text. 
270. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275 (explaining that Begay was the “sole decision of this Court 
concerning the reach of ACCA’s residual clause in which risk was not the dispositive factor”). 
271. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1993). Florida’s criminal attempt statute, also considered in James, 
likewise lacks any mention of risk. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007) (citing 
FLA. STAT. § 777.04.01 (1993)). 
272. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/31-6(a) (West Supp. 2008). 
273. James, 550 U.S. at 209. 
274. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129–30 (2009). 
275. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
276. See supra notes 73–87 and accompanying text. 
277. See Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128. 
278. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
279. See supra Part I.C.2. 
16 - WLR March 2012 Reavis Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:20 AM 
2012] VEHICLE FLIGHT AND ACCA 311 
 
aggressive” inquiry,280 focuses on whether the crime was “characteristic 
of the armed career criminal.”281 This criterion is consistent with 
congressional intent, but lacks apparent textual basis.282 
As introduced in Begay, the “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” test 
seemed to ask what conduct a crime “typically” involves, and so engages 
in a type of ordinary-case inquiry. As such, it conflicts with the 
categorical approach because this typical conduct is not usually spelled 
out in a crime’s statutory definition.283 In Sykes the Supreme Court 
narrowed Begay by holding that the “purposeful, violent, and 
aggressive” inquiry does not require specific conduct, but rather a mens 
rea element excluding crimes of negligence, recklessness, or strict 
liability.284 
Even interpreting “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” in this way, 
some tension remains between Begay and the categorical approach. 
Though the Court only assumes that felony DUI poses a sufficient risk 
of injury to another,285 it cites National Highway Safety Administration 
statistics in support of this assertion.286 Though common sense supports 
this conclusion, statistics are not among the sources Taylor permits a 
court to consult.287 
B. Sykes Comports with the Categorical Approach Only if Read 
Narrowly 
The elements and structure of Indiana’s vehicle-flight statute justify 
its inclusion within the residual provision consistent with the categorical 
approach. Justice Kagan’s dissent in Sykes, though arriving at a 
conclusion contrary to the majority’s, reinforces the categorical 
approach by focusing on the primacy of the crime’s statutory 
                                                     
280. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
281. See id. at 145 (quoting United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 980 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(McConnell, J., dissenting in part)). 
282. See id. at 150 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no basis (other than the necessity of 
resolving the present case) for holding that the enumerated and unenumerated crimes must be 
similar in respects other than the degree of risk that they pose.”); Holman, supra note 22, at 229–30 
(arguing that “the ‘likely shooter’ inquiry is a judicial creation without any root in the ACCA or its 
legislative history”). 
283. Holman, supra note 22, at 227–28. 
284. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275–76 (2011). 
285. Begay, 553 U.S. at 141–42. 
286. Id. (citing NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS, 2006 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT—ALCOHOL-RELATED FATALITIES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/810821.pdf). 
287. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
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definition.288 The “ordinary case” and statistical approaches should be 
considered non-dispositive because they cannot be squared with the 
categorical approach. 
1. Sykes’ Vehicle-Flight Conviction Required a Knowing Mental 
State and Triggered Punishment Identical to an Offense That 
Unquestionably Poses a Serious Risk of Injury 
In every one of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ACCA cases, two factors 
determine a crime’s inclusion in the residual provision: the requisite risk 
of injury and intent.289 The vehicle-flight statute considered in Sykes 
satisfies both requirements based on its statutory mens rea element and 
penalty structure. 
For the Sykes majority, Indiana’s decision to punish simple and 
aggravated vehicle flight equally demonstrates that both subsets of the 
offense categorically involve the risk of physical injury.290 Aggravated 
vehicle flight, as the state defines it, requires operating a vehicle “in a 
manner that creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another 
person.”291 Because this language closely tracks the residual provision’s 
“serious potential risk of physical injury to another” language,292 it 
indicates that aggravated vehicle flight, as defined by the Indiana 
legislature, possesses the risk level of a violent felony. Indeed, because it 
demands “risk” instead of mere “potential risk,” the aggravated crime 
arguably exceeds the residual provision’s threshold requirement.293 As 
the Sykes Court held, Indiana pegged the risk level of simple vehicle 
flight to its explicitly risky counterpart by subjecting them to the same 
penalty.294 As a whole, the statute containing the two flight crimes 
“reflect[s] a judgment that some offenses . . . can be committed without 
a vehicle or without creating substantial risks. They reflect the further 
judgment that this is not so for vehicle flights.”295 
The statutory structure and elements also satisfy the intent 
                                                     
288. See supra notes 243–249 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra Part I.A.2. 
290. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2276 (2011). 
291. IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(B) (1998). 
292. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006); Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(noting similarity in language between Indiana statute and ACCA). 
293. Cf. James v. United States, 555 U.S. 192, 207–08 (2007) (noting that the term “potential 
risk” is “inherently probabilistic”). 
294. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276; see also id. at 2282 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
295. Id. at 2276. 
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requirement articulated in Begay296 and clarified in Sykes297 because the 
statute criminalizes only knowing and intentional conduct.298 The statute 
defining vehicle flight thus provides a basis for both the risk level and 
intent requirement of an ACCA predicate, without trespassing the limits 
of the categorical approach. 
Justice Kagan reinforced the importance of Indiana’s statutory 
language in her Sykes dissent. She correctly focused on the statutory 
elements at issue instead of “some platonic form of an offence—here, 
some abstract notion of vehicular flight.”299 Her approach would qualify 
as ACCA predicates only those offenses that expressly require a serious 
risk of injury and violent intent.300 Justice Kennedy buries his discussion 
of the Indiana vehicle-flight statute near the end of his opinion, which 
risks signaling that the argument carries only a little weight with the five 
Justices in the Sykes majority. Justice Kagan declares that a “focus on 
statutory structure resolves this case,”301 and devotes her entire dissent to 
the issue.302 Counting heads, eight Justices thus considered statutory 
structure at least relevant to the determination,303 and two—Justices 
Kagan and Ginsburg—considered it dispositive.304 By focusing her 
dissent on the state statue and its structure, Justice Kagan prevents the 
issue from being buried in the majority opinion. That Justice Kagan 
reaches a different conclusion from the Sykes majority and concurrence 
should not disguise that each takes the same approach—asking whether 
the state’s definition of the offense suffices to meet the requirements of 
the residual provision. 
                                                     
296. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–46 (2008) (first articulating “purposeful, 
violent, and aggressive conduct” requirement). 
297. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275–76 (narrowing Begay to exclude only crimes of strict liability, 
negligence, and recklessness from the residual provision); supra notes 103–114 and accompanying 
text. 
298. IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3(a) (1998). 
299. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2289 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
300. Id. at 2288–89. 
301. Id. at 2292. 
302. See id. at 2288–96. Justice Thomas’ concurrence also concludes that equal punishment 
implies equal risk, echoing the majority’s reasoning on this point. Id. at 2281–84 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
303. Justice Scalia devotes his dissent to inveighing against the residual provision as 
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2284–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
304. Id. at 2292. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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2. Looking to the “Ordinary Case” of a Crime or to Statistics Cannot 
be Squared with the Categorical Approach 
Constitutional, equitable, and practical concerns alike compelled the 
Court to adopt the categorical approach.305 As set forth in Taylor, the 
categorical approach generally demands that an offense be judged only 
on the basis of its statutory description and judicially engrafted 
elements.306 Both a crime’s “ordinary case” commission and statistical 
data of its risks stand outside the crime’s elements. As such, 
consideration of either goes beyond what the categorical approach 
allows. 
The “ordinary case” approach first used in James is essentially an 
appeal to the judicial imagination.307 Comparing Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion in James with Justice Scalia’s dissent highlights the subjectivity 
of the “ordinary case” test. Justice Alito explained that because, by 
definition, an attempted burglary involves interruption, the risk of 
confrontation—and hence physical injury—is greater than for the 
completed crime.308 Justice Scalia argued the opposite—because 
successful entry of a building marks the line between completed and 
attempted burglary, a merely attempted burglar, perforce, never made it 
inside.309 As such, the attempted burglar runs no risk of potentially 
dangerous confrontation with the building’s occupants.310 The Justices’ 
respective intuitions, rather than any facet of attempted burglary’s 
statutory definition, determined the inquiry’s outcome. 
This exchange more importantly demonstrates how imagining the 
ordinary case departs from the categorical approach. Both Justices Alito 
and Scalia base the risk—or potential risk—of burglary on the 
possibility of confrontation between the burglar and some third party.311 
Yet the Florida statute considered in James does not require a risk of a 
confrontation, entry into an occupied building, or interruption of the 
attempted burglary.312 There is no way of determining whether Justice 
                                                     
305. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990); supra notes 134–140 and 
accompanying text. 
306. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
307. See Holman, supra note 22, at 244–49 (arguing that the “ordinary case approach” is 
inconsistent with the categorical approach). 
308. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 204 (2007). 
309. Id. at 225–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
310. Id. at 227. 
311. Id. at 204 (majority opinion); id. at 227 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
312. See FLA. STAT. § 810.02 (1993). 
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Alito’s, Justice Scalia’s, or some other order of events represents the 
ordinary case of burglary “look[ing] only to the fact of conviction and 
the statutory definition of the prior offense”—the only considerations 
allowed under Taylor’s categorical approach.313 Deciding what the 
ordinary case of an offense actually is—a necessary first step in 
determining the risk created in that ordinary case—requires the sort of 
factual finding Taylor sought to avoid.314 The ordinary case approach 
thus conflicts with the categorical approach that applies to ACCA.315 
The ordinary case examples in Sykes have even less connection to the 
statutory elements than James. Similar to James, which posited a risk 
arising from conflict between a would-be burglar and a building’s 
occupants,316 Justice Kennedy opined that vehicle flight poses a risk of 
injury from possible confrontation between the criminal and the 
pursuing police.317 Counterintuitively, the only risk he identifies arises 
from police conduct, as they will likely engage in dangerous maneuvers 
in their effort to apprehend the fleeing suspect.318 The offense at issue in 
Sykes fails to include an explicit element of risk-causing behavior by the 
suspect or the police.319 And because the statute defining that offense 
also sets out a spectrum of vehicle-flight offenses, only some of which 
explicitly require risk of injury, the state presumably did not consider 
this risk present in all vehicle-flight conduct.320 Only the statute’s 
punishment structure allowed the Court to escape this inference.321 
Though less subjective than the “ordinary case” inquiry, reliance on 
                                                     
313. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). 
314. See id. at 600–02; James, 550 U.S. at 231 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
majority’s approach involves an unproven factual determination, in contravention of Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (prohibiting sentencing based on facts neither found by a jury nor 
admitted by the defendant)). 
315. Holman, supra note 22, at 244–49. 
316. James, 550 U.S. at 203–04. 
317. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273–74 (2011). 
318. See id. at 2273 (“Because an accepted way to restrain a driver who poses dangers to others is 
through seizure, officers pursuing fleeing drivers may deem themselves duty bound to escalate their 
response to ensure the felon is apprehended.”). 
319. The case cited by Justice Kennedy as supporting risk in the ordinary case of vehicle flight, 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), involved a suspect rendered paraplegic after police rammed 
his fleeing car. The residual provision, however, requires serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another—not to the person committing the crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (“. . . or 
otherwise involves . . . potential risk of physical injury to another.”) (emphasis added). 
320. See IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3 (1998); Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2288–96 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(inferring a state determination that some vehicle-flight offenses are non-risky). 
321. Cf. infra Part II.C (discussing the Court’s failure to uphold a Sixth Circuit opinion holding 
that vehicle flight was a crime of violence based on a state statute similar to the one in Sykes, but 
lacking equivalent punishment to an offense requiring risk of injury as an element). 
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statistics to determine the inherent riskiness of an offense, as the Court 
did in Chambers, also exceeds the supposed scope of the categorical 
approach.322 The studies set forth in Sykes—completed by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police,323 the Department of 
Justice,324 and the U.S. Fire Administration325—provide compelling 
evidence of vehicle flight’s high risk level relative to burglary and 
arson.326 But because statistics are unconnected to a crime’s statutory 
elements, their use cannot be reconciled with faithful application of the 
categorical approach.327 Further, judicial use of statistical findings that 
have not been submitted to a jury or stipulated by the defendant in a plea 
raise constitutional concerns.328 Courts generally rely on legislation for 
such blanket factual determinations.329 Indeed, deference to legislative 
determination of what crimes present danger, either of physical injury or 
future criminal activity, lies at the heart of ACCA.330 
C. The Narrow Reading Explains Rogers’ Remand 
The Court’s remand in Rogers v. United States331 is entirely congruent 
with the narrow reading of Sykes but inexplicable under the broad 
reading. 
                                                     
322. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133–34 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“What 
is worse is that each new application of the residual clause seems to lead us further and further away 
from the statutory text. Today’s decision, for example, turns on little more than a statistical analysis 
of a research report prepared by the United States Sentencing Commission.”). 
323. LUM & FACHNER, supra note 42, at 54 (showing 313 injuries to police or bystanders during 
7737 vehicle flights). 
324. CATALANO, supra note 226, at 1, 9–10 (showing injuries to a victim in 44.3% of the 266,160 
burglaries where a household member was present, or 117,909 injuries, out of 3.7 million burglaries 
every year). 
325. Relying on the sources cited supra note 225, Justice Kennedy found 1255 injuries resulted 
from an estimated 38,400 arsons in 2008. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2274–
75 (2011). 
326. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2280 (Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing statistics of injuries 
associated with arson, burglary, and vehicle flight). 
327. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (restricting information a court may 
consider under the categorical approach); supra Part I.B. 
328. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
329. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (noting that the 
legislature “is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data 
bearing upon legislative questions” (internal quotations omitted)). 
330. See supra Part I.A.1 (arguing that ACCA rests on legislative determination that certain 
offenses are likely to identify career criminals). 
331. __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
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The remanded Sixth Circuit opinion332 held that a Tennessee vehicle-
flight offense described a crime of violence.333 Like the statute at issue in 
Sykes, the Tennessee statute described a spectrum of vehicle-flight 
offenses requiring various risk levels.334 Also as in Sykes, the Tennessee 
offense under consideration in Rogers did not itself explicitly require an 
element of risk.335 Unlike the statute in Sykes, however, Tennessee does 
not punish this lesser vehicle-flight offense equally as an aggravated 
offense that does require risk of injury to another as an element.336 This 
difference in allocating punishment is the only feature distinguishing the 
two states’ vehicle-flight statutes. Rogers’ offense thus lacks the 
statutory basis present in Sykes for determining that vehicle flight 
categorically poses sufficient risk of injury. Under the narrow reading of 
Sykes this Comment proposes, this statutory argument is the only basis 
for the outcome in Sykes that faithfully comports with the categorical 
approach.337 The lack of this statutory basis in Rogers explains the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision to remand instead of denying certiorari and 
allowing the decision to stand. 
The basis for that determination the Sixth Circuit actually does 
supply, though, is in perfect keeping with the “ordinary case” argument 
present in Sykes.338 Like the Sykes majority, the Rogers court reasons 
that “the decision to flee thus carries with it the requisite potential risk” 
because of the “marked likelihood of pursuit and confrontation” 
associated with vehicle flight.339 If such “ordinary case” reasoning 
provided a sufficient basis for the outcome in Sykes, then similar 
reasoning should also suffice in Rogers. A broad reading of Sykes that 
relies on an “ordinary case” approach provides no explanation for 
remanding Rogers. 
                                                     
332. United States v. Rogers, 594 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2010). 
333. Id. at 520–21 (considering TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-603(b)(1) (1995)). As discussed, 
interpretations of the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” are fungible. See supra note 
22. 
334. Compare IND. CODE § 35-44-3-3 (1997), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-603. 
335. Because the record was ambiguous, the Rogers court assumed the prior conviction had been 
for a less serious offense that did not require “a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or 
other third parties.” Rogers, 594 F.3d at 521 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-603(b)(3)). 
336. “[V]iolation of subsection (b) is a Class E felony unless the flight or attempt to elude creates 
a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties, in which case a violation of 
subsection (b) is a Class D felony.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-603(b)(3). 
337. See supra Part III. 
338. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273–74 (2011). 
339. Rogers, 594 F.3d at 521 (quoting United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 
2009)). 
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In contrast, on the same day as Rogers, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in United States v. Harris340 and United States v. 
Dismuke,341 two other cases involving categorical determinations of the 
risk posed by vehicle flight. Harris holds that a Florida offense requiring 
“[d]riv[ing] at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a 
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property” is a crime of 
violence.342 Dismuke holds that a Wisconsin offense requiring 
“interfere[ing] with or endanger[ing] the operation of the police vehicle, 
or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians” is a violent 
felony.343 Both these state statutes contain some statutory requirement of 
risk, and the U.S. Supreme Court let stand categorical determinations 
that met the residual provision’s risk requirement.344 The Court only 
remanded Rogers, which lacked such a statutory hook.345 
Interpreting Sykes to require that the determination of a vehicle-flight 
conviction’s risk level turns solely on statutory analysis of the state 
criminal law gives the best explanation for the remand in Rogers. This 
narrow reading also harmonizes Sykes with Taylor’s holding that the 
categorical approach be used in testing for ACCA predicates. Reading 
Sykes narrowly thus adheres to both the U.S. Supreme Court’s earliest 
and most recent ACCA precedent, and vindicates the fundamental 
concerns protected by Taylor’s categorical approach. For a vehicle-flight 
offense to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s residual provision, 
both the requirements of violent intent and risk level must be met by 
looking only to the statute describing the offense. 
III. TAKING SYKES ON THE ROAD: HOW CIRCUIT COURT 
VEHICLE-FLIGHT DECISIONS FARE UNDER THE NARROW 
READING 
Sykes effectively invalidates much of the reasoning behind prior lower 
court decisions concerning vehicle flight as an ACCA predicate. Though 
the U.S. Supreme Court did not purport to overrule James, Begay, or 
Chambers, the bases for those decisions did not control in Sykes346 or 
                                                     
340. 586 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
341. 593 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
342. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 316.1935(3)(a) (2004)). 
343. Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 590 (emphasis added) (quoting WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3) (2000)). 
344. Harris v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011); Dismuke v. United States, 
__U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
345. Rogers v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
346. See supra Part II.B.2 (arguing that the “ordinary case” and statistical analysis approaches, 
respectively imported from James and Chambers, do not dispose of Sykes). 
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were significantly limited.347 Instead, only vehicle-flight offenses that 
require an element of risk or, as in Sykes, share equivalent punishment 
with another offense in the same statute that does feature that risk 
requirement, should be included as predicates under the residual 
provision. Justice Kagan sets the proper tone: “some vehicular flight 
offenses should count as violent felonies under ACCA,”348 she writes, 
“but a statute criminalizing only simple vehicular flight would 
not . . . .”349 
The Fifth,350 Seventh,351 Eighth,352 Ninth,353 and Tenth Circuits354 
have reexamined vehicle flight with the benefit of Sykes. While each 
determined that the vehicle-flight conviction at issue qualifies as a 
violent felony,355 their readings of Sykes differ. The Fifth and Tenth 
                                                     
347. Sykes narrows Begay’s “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” test from many 
circuits’ interpretations. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2275–76 (2011) 
(clarifying that “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct” applies only to disqualify crimes of 
strict liability, negligence, or recklessness); id. at 2285 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that all eleven 
circuits, as well as the Government brief in Sykes, had “overread” Begay in the same way the Sykes 
majority accuses Sykes of doing). But see supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text (noting the 
Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Begay essentially presaged the Sykes Court’s narrowing of 
“purposeful, violent and aggressive”). 
348. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2289 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
349. Id. at 2290. 
350. United States v. Tubbs, No. 10-51043, 2011 WL 5026393 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011), cert 
denied, No. 11-8298, 2012 WL 123815 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012); United States v. Garrison, No. 11-
10105, 2011 WL 3630116 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011). 
351. United States v. Wilson, No. 11-1147, 2011 WL 4381703 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011); United 
States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Molinaro, 428 F. App’x 649 (7th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012). 
352. United States v. Lamar, 419 F. App’x 704 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 1323 S. 
Ct. 538. 
353. United States v. Peterson, No. 07-30465, 2011 WL 5041673 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 11-8464, 2012 WL 218134 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012); United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694 
(9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-8249 (U.S. Dec. 30, 2011).  
354. United States v. Stout, 439 Fed. App’x 738, 748–50 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-
8233, 2012 WL 113421 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012); United States v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 
2011). 
355. Peterson, 2011 WL 5041673, at *1; Tubbs, 2011 WL 5026393, at *1; Stout, 439 Fed. App’x 
at 749–50; Wilson, 2011 WL 4381703, at *1; Garrison, 2011 WL 3630116, at *1; Griffin, 652 F.3d 
at 801–02; Molinaro, 428 F. App’x at 652; Thomas, 643 F.3d at 806; Lamar, 419 F. App’x at 705; 
Snyder, 643 F.3d at 700. Though Peterson, Stout, Wilson, Griffin, Molinaro, and Thomas each 
technically held that vehicle flight was a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) instead of a 
“violent felony” under ACCA, in each case the terms are equivalent. See Peterson, 2011 WL 
5041673, at *1 (“[C]ases interpreting the term ‘violent felony’ are controlling as to whether a 
particular offense constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ . . . .”); Stout, 439 Fed App’x at 749 (determining 
that holding from a case dealing with the definition of “crime of violence” controlled cases 
involving “violent felonies”); Wilson, 2011 WL 4381703, at *1 (“[W]e also have held that similar 
statutes in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois define crimes of violence or violent felonies . . . .”); 
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Circuits read Sykes too broadly as standing for the proposition that all 
felony convictions for vehicle flight qualify as violent felonies.356 The 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits correctly consider only individual criminal 
statutes, but overlook which aspect of the Indiana statute at issue in 
Sykes produced the outcome in that case.357 Only the Seventh Circuit—
Sykes’ home—acknowledges the correct basis for the Supreme Court’s 
decision. 
A. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits Misread Sykes as Holding That All 
Felony Vehicle-Flight Offenses Are Violent Felonies 
Two recent cases from the Fifth Circuit incorrectly read Sykes as 
sweeping every vehicle-flight felony offense into the residual provision. 
United States v. Tubbs358 and United States v. Garrison,359 two 
identically worded summary opinions, claim that Sykes validated the 
Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision in United States v. Harrimon.360 Instead 
of validating Harrimon, Sykes in fact calls it into question. 
Harrimon determined that vehicle flight as defined by Texas361 
amounted to a violent felony within the meaning of ACCA.362 The court 
focused on whether the crime was “roughly similar” to the enumerated 
                                                     
Griffin, 652 F.3d at 802 (“[T]he definition of ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA is the same as the 
definition of ‘crime of violence’ in section 4B1.2 of the guidelines, and ‘[i]t would be inappropriate 
to treat identical texts differently just because of a different caption[]’ . . . .” (quoting United States 
v. Templeton, 543 F. 3d 378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008))); Molinaro, 428 F. App’x at 652 (characterizing 
Sykes’ holding as “uph[olding] our conclusion that a conviction under a similar Indiana statute . . . is 
a crime of violence” (citation omitted)); Thomas, 643 F.3d at 805 (“Because of this commonality of 
language in the residual clauses of the ACCA and USSG § 4B1.2(a), we have consistently 
interpreted them identically.”); supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting the interchangeability 
of jurisprudence interpreting the respective residual provisions). 
356. See Tubbs, 2011 WL 5026393, at *1; (claiming Sykes affirmed decision in United States v. 
Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009)); Stout, 2011 439 Fed. App’x at 749—50 (asserting that 
Sykes “categorically determined a defendant’s intentional vehicular flight from an officer’s 
command to stop is a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA”); Garrison, 2011 WL 3630116, at *1 
(decision worded identically to Tubbs). 
357. See Peterson, 2011 WL 5041673, at *1 (asserting the Indiana statute considered in Sykes is 
functionally identical to an Oregon vehicle-flight statute with no comparable legislative indicia of 
risk); Lamar, 419 F. App’x at 705 (asserting Sykes required no proof of risk of injury). 
358. No. 10-51043, 2011 WL 5026393 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011), cert denied, No. 11-8298, 2012 
WL 123815 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). 
359. No. 11-10105, 2011 WL 3630116 (5th Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) 
360. Tubbs, 2011 WL 5026393, at *1; Garrison, 2011 WL 3630116, at *1 (both citing Harrimon, 
568 F.3d 531). 
361. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (West 2011). 
362. Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 537. 
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offenses in both kind and degree of risk posed.363 In determining 
whether the Texas vehicle-flight offense is similar to the enumerated 
offenses, the court asked whether vehicle flight is purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive, mirroring Begay’s violent intent requirement.364 The 
court determined “similar risk” by examining the risk of injury to 
another posed by the ordinary case of vehicle flight.365 
The elements of Texas’ vehicle-flight offense require knowingly and 
intentionally fleeing a police officer attempting a lawful arrest, and using 
a vehicle while in flight.366 As the Fifth Circuit explains, this offense 
involves the requisite violent intent because disregarding a lawful order 
“is a clear challenge to the officer’s authority,” and thus equivalent to 
aggression.367 The offense also poses the dangers caused by reckless 
driving and potential confrontation with police that typically attend 
vehicle flight.368 The same study cited by Chambers confirmed the 
danger inherent in an “ordinary” vehicle flight.369 The Harrimon court 
found this reasoning applicable to all vehicle-flight offenses. 
Even passing over the Fifth Circuit’s suspect basis for identifying 
violent intent,370 its bases for establishing risk are extra-statutory and 
thus inconsistent with the narrow reading of Sykes.371 Rigorously 
applying the categorical approach as set out in Taylor, as this Comment 
proposes, does not permit a court to rest its determination of risk on 
hypothetical typical conduct or statistics.372 The elements of Texas’ 
vehicle-flight statute simply fail to evince any requirement of risk.373 
                                                     
363. Id. at 534. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 536–37. 
366. See Powell v. State, 206 S.W.3d 142, 143 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining elements of a 
violation of TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04 (West 2003)). 
367. Harrimon, 568 F.3d at 535. 
368. Id. 
369. Id. at 537. 
370. Begay rejects the argument that purposeful conduct meets the residual provision’s mens rea 
requirement without also being directed towards some violent end. See Begay v. United States, 553 
U.S. 137, 145–46 (2008) (purposefully getting drunk did not satisfy intent requirement). And 
Chambers casts doubt on the assumption that merely disobeying law enforcement qualifies as 
aggression. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128–30 (2009) (noting that failure to 
report did not display purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, and was not a violent felony). 
371. See supra Part II.B (arguing that the “ordinary case” and statistical-analysis approaches are 
inconsistent with the categorical approach). 
372. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (requiring the court to “look only to 
the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense”). 
373. See Powell v. State, 206 S.W.3d 142, 143 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 38.04 (West 2003)) (providing elements of the crime). 
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There is no requirement of actual or potential risk, unless one assumes 
that such risk is inherent in the use of a vehicle. Further, Texas 
differentiates between simple and aggravated vehicle flight, and 
punishes the latter more severely.374 Because the Texas offense 
resembles the offense at issue in Rogers375 more than the offense upheld 
as a violent felony in Sykes,376 the decision in Harrimon should not 
stand. 
The Tenth Circuit has also applied Sykes without due consideration of 
distinguishing statutory features. In United States v. Stout,377 the Tenth 
Circuit claimed that Sykes “categorically determined a defendant’s 
intentional vehicular flight from an officer’s command to stop is a 
‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.”378 In United States v. Thomas,379 the 
court asserted that the statute at issue was “identical in all relevant 
respects”380 to the statute in Sykes without taking notice of Indiana’s 
penalty structure—the dispositive provision in Sykes because it gave a 
statutory mechanism for finding risk even though the offense did not 
require risk as an element.381 However, unlike the vehicle-flight statutes 
the Fifth Circuit considered in Harrimon, Tubbs, and Garrison, the 
statutes the Tenth Circuit considered contain sufficient grounds to 
support Thomas’ and Stout’s respective results. 
In Thomas and Stout the Tenth Circuit held that the offenses at issue 
qualify as crimes of violence,382 the functional equivalent of a violent 
felony.383 Thomas concerned a vehicle-flight offense as defined by 
Kansas,384 and Stout involved an Oklahoma offense.385 The Oklahoma 
                                                     
374. Without aggravating factors, Texas treats vehicle flight as a state-jail felony punishable by 
up to two years’ imprisonment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 38.04(b)(1) (West 2011), 12.35(a) (West 
1994). The aggravating factors of a previous vehicle-flight conviction or serious injury resulting 
from police attempts to apprehend the suspect transform the offense into a third-degree felony, 
punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment. Id. §§ 38.04(b)(2), 12.34(a). 
375. United States v. Rogers, 594 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2010) (considering TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
16-603(b)(3) (1995)), vacated and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 3018 (2011). 
376. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011) (considering IND. CODE § 35-44-3-
3(b)(1)(A) (1998)). 
377. 439 Fed. App’x 738, 748–50 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 11-8233, 2012 WL 113421 
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). 
378. Id. at 749–50. 
379. 643 F.3d 802 (10th Cir. 2011). 
380. Id. at 806. 
381. See supra Part II. 
382. Stout, 439 Fed. App’x at 750; Thomas, 643 F.3d at 806. 
383. Stout, 439 Fed. App’x at 749; Thomas, 643 F.3d at 805; see also supra note 22 and 
accompanying text. 
384. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1568 (2009). 
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statute at issue in Stout requires willfully eluding police after being 
signaled to stop “in such manner as to endanger any other person.”386 
The Kansas statute in Thomas differentiates vehicle flight from failure to 
stop based on the presence of certain aggravating factors—evading a 
roadblock or tire-puncture devices, engaging in reckless driving, causing 
vehicle accidents or property damage, multiple moving violations, or 
commission of a separate felony.387 Both Oklahoma and Kansas 
separately criminalize eluding without the additional element of 
endangerment or aggravating factors in the same statute but punish it 
less severely.388 
Oklahoma’s statutory endangerment requirement categorically 
satisfies the residual provision’s risk level requirement, as does Kansas’ 
“reckless driving” aggravating factor. Kansas’ decision to equate 
reckless driving with the other aggravating factors for purposes of 
penalty enhancement is the functional equivalent of Sykes’ equal-
punishment rationale.389 Less obviously risky aggravating factors such as 
roadblock-evasion “borrow” reckless driving’s risk level through 
implied legislative determination.390 The result in Thomas, which 
considered two convictions involving the aggravating factors of evading 
a tire-puncture device and separate felony commission,391 can therefore 
be explained under the categorical approach. Nonetheless, the Tenth 
Circuit’s expansive reading of Sykes392 does not ensure that the court’s 
future decisions will be consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
                                                     
385. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540A(B) (2000). 
386. Id. 
387. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1568(b). Kansas’ penalty structure partly resembles Sykes’ Indiana 
statute—three or more failures to stop receive equal punishment as aggravated vehicle flight. Id. § 
8-1568(c)(3). Justice Kagan wrote that Sykes “decides almost no case other than this one,” Sykes v. 
United States, __U.S. __131 S. Ct. 2267, 2295 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), and 
a three-time Kansas failure-to-stop convict would justify her qualification. 
388. The element of endangerment increases the maximum term of imprisonment from one year 
to five for an Oklahoma vehicle flight. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540A(B). Aggravating factors 
transform Kansas vehicle flight into a “level 9, person felony.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1568(c)(4). 
389. See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[T]he similarity in punishment for these related, overlapping 
offenses suggests that subsection (b)(1)(A) is the rough equivalent of one type of subsection 
(b)(1)(B) violation” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 325–33. 
390. Cf. Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2276 (reasoning that the state legislature considered similarly 
punished vehicle-flight offenses similarly serious in risk). 
391. See United States v. Thomas, 643 F.3d 802, 806 (10th Cir. 2011). 
392. See United States v. Stout, 439 Fed. App’x 738, 748–50 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, No. 
11-8233, 2012 WL 113421 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). 
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B. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits Consider Vehicle-Flight Offenses 
Individually but Overlook Sykes’ Statutory Basis for Determining 
Risk 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits read Sykes with more restraint than the 
Fifth and Eighth inasmuch as they only hold to be violent felonies 
offenses that they claim are equal to or greater than Indiana’s vehicle-
flight offense in terms of risk level.393 They nonetheless fail to recognize 
legislative determination of the offenses’ risk level as Sykes’ dispositive 
element. 
In United States v. Lamar394 the Eighth Circuit held that a Missouri 
vehicle-flight offense qualifies as a violent felony.395 Because the 
offense requires “fleeing in such a manner that the person fleeing creates 
a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any person,”396 
Missouri’s statutory language suffices to show the requisite risk level. 
And because that flight must be purposeful as well as accomplished in a 
dangerous manner,397 the offense also involves sufficient intent to justify 
inclusion as a violent felony. But Lamar incorrectly reads Sykes’ mens 
rea requirement, stating that “[i]n Sykes, the Court held that a driver of a 
vehicle who knowingly or intentionally flees from a law enforcement 
officer commits a violent felony even though in the statute at issue, as 
here, there was no mens rea requirement related to the risk of injury.”398 
The Eighth Circuit errs only slightly regarding intent. A violent 
felony within the residual provision requires more than reckless intent 
regarding the risk-causing behavior, which the “knowing” flight offense 
considered in Sykes evinced.399 The offense considered in Lamar also 
connects intent to the risk-causing conduct—the offense requires actual 
knowledge of fleeing to prevent an arrest.400 But while the residual 
                                                     
393. See United States v. Lamar, 419 F. App’x 704, 705 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 
1323 S. Ct. 538 (“[The offense in Sykes] did not require proof of a risk of injury unlike the Missouri 
law Lamar violated.”); United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 11-8249 (Dec. 30, 2011). (“The statute at issue in Sykes is similar enough to the statute at 
issue here that the Supreme Court’s Sykes ruling controls this case.”). 
394. 419 F. App’x 704 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 1323 S. Ct. 538. 
395. Id. at 705. 
396. MO. REV. STAT. § 575.150(5) (2009). 
397. United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding after Begay and 
Chambers that “purposeful fleeing in a dangerous manner,” as proscribed by the statute, is a crime 
of violence). 
398. Lamar, 419 F. App’x at 705. 
399. Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2271 (2011) (quoting Woodward v. 
State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). 
400. See MO. REV. STAT. § 575.150(1) (requiring violations be undertaken “knowing that a law 
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provision does not explicitly require specific intent as to risk,401 Begay 
interprets the provision to require some connection between intent and 
risk.402 
With regard to risk, the Lamar court observes that the statute in Sykes 
“did not require proof of a risk of injury.”403 The court’s reasoning does 
not, however, acknowledge the implied legislative determination of risk 
that overcame this lack in Sykes.404 The Eighth Circuit appears to read 
Sykes as holding that vehicle flight poses an inherent risk, without 
requiring risk as a specific element or some other legislative 
determination. By not requiring such a statutory basis, the Eighth Circuit 
departs from Taylor’s rigorous categorical approach.405 Though Lamar 
reaches a justifiable result because it considers a statute that does require 
the element of risk, the Eighth Circuit’s current reading of Sykes 
threatens to incorrectly sweep vehicle-flight offenses into the residual 
provision—for instance, the Minnesota vehicle-flight offense determined 
not to be a crime of violence in the 2009 case United States v Tyler.406 
The Ninth Circuit likewise reads Sykes too broadly in United States v. 
Snyder,407 which holds that vehicle flight as prohibited by Oregon408 
qualifies as a violent felony. The Ninth Circuit had concluded the 
offense was not a crime of violence in 2009 in United States v. 
Peterson.409 However, in October of 2011 the Ninth Circuit withdrew 
Peterson’s initial disposition and substituted an opinion concluding 
Oregon vehicle flight qualifies as a crime of violence under Sykes and 
                                                     
enforcement officer is making an arrest”); Hudson, 577 F.3d at 886 (noting offense requires “actual 
knowledge” of fleeing for the purpose of preventing an arrest). 
401. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “general intent,” not requiring 
specific intent, as “[t]he intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the 
consequences that result”). 
402. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
403. Lamar, 419 F. App’x at 705. 
404. See supra notes 238–242 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.1. 
405. See supra Part II.B (arguing that Sykes is only consistent with the categorical approach 
because of the statutory basis for determining that its offense presented a risk of injury). 
406. 580 F.3d 722, 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2009). Tyler considered a statute which punishes anyone 
who “by means of a motor vehicle flees or attempts to flee a peace officer.” Id. (quoting MINN. 
STAT. § 609.487(3) (2011)). 
407. 643 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 2011), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-8249 (Dec. 30, 2011). 
408. OR. REV. STAT. § 811.540(1) (1997).  
409. No. 07–30465, 2009 WL 3437834 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2009), withdrawn and replaced by 2011 
WL 5041673 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011). The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the withdrawn opinion 
“stood at least in tension, if not in conflict,” with the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning. Sykes v. United 
States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2272 (2011). 
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Snyder.410 Peterson (as amended) and Snyder both rely on the 
determination that “there is no material distinction between the Indiana 
and Oregon vehicle flight statutes.”411 Like the Eighth Circuit in Lamar, 
the Ninth Circuit passed over the statutory structure of Sykes’ state 
offense that supported a categorical determination of risk of injury. 
Oregon’s vehicle-flight offense contains no element of risk: its 
elements are (1) a person operates a vehicle, and (2) an officer in 
uniform or driving a marked car signals the vehicle to stop, but (3) “[t]he 
person, while still in the vehicle, knowingly flees or attempts to elude a 
pursuing police officer.”412 The conduct encompassed by these elements 
“runs the gamut—from simple to aggravated vehicular flight, from the 
least violent to the most violent form of the activity.”413 Nor does 
Oregon follow Indiana’s example and treat vehicle flight as a “crime[] of 
the same magnitude” of some other offense explicitly involving risk.414 
The statute recognizes flight by foot as a lesser offense,415 but fails to 
peg vehicle flight’s risk level, through equal punishment or otherwise, to 
an offense with an explicit element of risk of injury.416 Without a 
statutory basis for finding risk, Snyder’s holding that Oregon’s vehicle 
flight offense is a crime of violence is unsupported by the narrow 
reading of Sykes. 
C. The Seventh Circuit Recognizes Sykes’ Statutory Basis for 
Categorically Determining the Risk Posed by Vehicle Flight 
In three cases decided since Sykes—United States v. Wilson,417 United 
                                                     
410. United States v. Peterson, No. 07–30465, 2011 WL 5041673 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2011), cert. 
denied, No. 11-8464, 2012 WL 218134 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012). 
411. Id. at *1; see also Snyder, 643 F.3d at 699. 
412. OR. REV. STAT. § 811.540(1)(b)(A). 
413. See Sykes v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2290–91 (2011) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (characterizing Indiana’s statute, and arguing that this feature was inconsistent with 
categorically deeming the offense a violent felony). 
414. Id. at 2276 (majority opinion). 
415. Flight by foot is a Class A misdemeanor, OR. REV. STAT. § 811.540(3)(b), and vehicle flight 
a Class C felony, id. at (3)(a). 
416. Oregon’s code does elsewhere contain offenses which present a risk of injury, and which are 
punished as Class C felonies similar to vehicle flight. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 811.705 (2001) 
(failure to remain at the scene of an accident); OR. REV. STAT. § 811.127 (2003) (organizing a 
speed-racing event). But because these offenses are defined in entirely separate statutes enacted in 
different years, they present a different situation than Indiana’s statute—which defined both 
“related, overlapping” (and equally punished) vehicle-flight offenses within the same statute. Sykes, 
131 S. Ct. at 2276. 
417. No. 11-1147, 2011 WL 4381703 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011). 
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States v. Griffin,418 and United States v. Molinaro419—the Seventh 
Circuit reached a result consistent with the narrow reading of Sykes. 
Griffin goes one step further, explicitly acknowledging the statutory 
basis for this reading.420 
Before being arrested and charged on “a number of drug- and gun-
related crimes,”421 Griffin had sustained a conviction for vehicle flight 
under the same Indiana statute as Sykes.422 Because Sykes controlled, the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding that Griffin’s prior conviction qualified as a 
crime of violence is unquestionably correct. However, the Seventh 
Circuit did more than summarily dismiss the issue in the face of binding 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent: it analyzed Sykes’ discussion of the 
Indiana statute’s structure, which supported the proposition that under 
Indiana law “there is no need to independently prove that fleeing from 
an officer creates a substantial risk of bodily injury.”423 This argument, 
the court opined, left Griffin “without a leg to stand on.”424 As in Sykes, 
the Seventh Circuit discussed the statute’s penalty structure in response 
to an argument raised by the petitioner.425 Griffin provides no other basis 
for risk level. But because Sykes dealt with precisely the same statute, 
the Griffin court did not have to provide any discussion beyond pointing 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s controlling decision. Its focus on this issue 
suggests that the Seventh Circuit identifies statutory language as the 
controlling feature of Sykes’ residual provision analysis. 
Wilson and Molinaro do not contain the same level of analysis as 
Griffin, but reach results consistent with the narrow reading of Sykes. 
Wilson considered a vehicle-flight offense from Michigan;426 Molinaro 
considered a vehicle-flight offense from Wisconsin.427 Both cases hold 
the conviction a crime of violence, reaffirming pre-Sykes Sixth and 
                                                     
418. 652 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012). 
419. 428 F. App’x 649 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012). 
420. Serendipity has it that the first circuit court opinion to grasp Sykes would be written by 
Circuit Judge Sykes. See Griffin, 652 F.3d at 795. 
421. Id. 
422. Id. at 801–02. 
423. Id. at 802. 
424. Id. 
425. See id. (“The [Sykes] Court rejected as ‘unconvincing’ an argument identical to Griffin’s 
here . . . .”). 
426. United States v. Wilson, No. 11-1147, 2011 WL 4381703, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011) 
(considering MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a(1) (2002)). 
427. United States v. Molinaro, 428 F. App’x 649, 651–52 (7th Cir. 2011) (considering WIS. 
STAT. § 346.04(3) (2000)), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012). 
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Seventh Circuit precedent as undisturbed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision.428 
Wilson challenged the characterization of a prior vehicle-flight 
conviction as a crime of violence.429 Seventh Circuit precedent 
foreclosed Wilson’s argument, but he sought to preserve the issue 
pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sykes.430 Because Sykes 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s determination that vehicle-flight, “as 
defined by Indiana, is a violent felony,” the Wilson court affirmed 
Wilson’s sentence with little discussion.431 
The narrow reading of Sykes supports Wilson’s outcome. The 
Michigan statute at issue prohibits a spectrum of conduct: at its base, 
vehicle flight requires willfully failing to heed a police signal to stop, 
and instead “increasing the speed of the vehicle, extinguishing the lights 
of the vehicle, or otherwise attempting to flee or elude.”432 Without other 
elements, the offense is “fourth-degree fleeing and eluding,” punishable 
by up to two years.433 Aggravating factors—either causing a collision, or 
fleeing through a thirty-five miles-per-hour zone—increase the offense 
to the third-degree, which carries a maximum punishment of five years’ 
incarceration.434 Because Wilson sustained a conviction for third-degree 
flight, the statute’s elements of “willfulness” and aggravating factors 
categorically meet the residual provision’s requirements of risk level and 
intent.435 
Molinaro also summarily rejected a challenge brought during Sykes’ 
pendency.436 The Seventh Circuit had previously held that the vehicle-
                                                     
428. The Seventh Circuit held the Wisconsin law a crime of violence in United States v. Dismuke, 
593 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2010). It held the Michigan law both a crime of violence, United States 
v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2004), and a violent felony, United States v. LaCasse, 567 
F.3d 763, 764 (6th Cir. 2009). 
429. Wilson, 2011 WL 4381703, at *1. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.479a(1) (2002). 
433. Id. § 750.479a(2). 
434. Id. § 750.479a(3). 
435. If Michigan had made fleeing through a thirty-five miles per hour zone the only aggravating 
factor (or at least the riskiest), this may arguably have failed to categorically establish risk level. 
However, setting it out as an aggravating factor equal to causing a collision presents the same 
implication of legislative determination of risk underlying Sykes. Cf. supra notes 290–295 and 
accompanying text (explaining legislative determination of equivalent risk implicit in ascribing the 
same penalty to different offense). 
436. See United States v. Molinaro, 428 F. App’x 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
__U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1124 (2012). After noting that Sykes affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s decision 
regarding Indiana’s similar statute, the court passed over Molinaro’s argument without further 
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flight offense that Molinaro had been convicted of was a crime of 
violence.437 Sykes gave the Seventh Circuit no reason to reconsider its 
position, and it affirmed Molinaro’s sentence with little discussion of the 
issue.438 
The Wisconsin statute at issue in Molinaro nonetheless contains 
grounds for determining that the offense presents sufficient risk to 
qualify under the residual provision. It requires “willful or wanton 
disregard” for a police signal to stop, combined with endangering the 
police, traffic, or pedestrians, or increasing speed and extinguishing 
lights.439 The offense sits atop three other less severe offenses 
prohibiting disobeying police orders.440 The requirements of willfulness 
and endangerment provide statutory bases both for the intent and risk of 
injury necessary to qualify under the residual provision.441 
So far, only the Seventh Circuit has followed the narrow reading of 
Sykes by interpreting vehicle-flight offenses as spelled out in Taylor—
looking only to the statutory definition.442 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the categorical approach the very 
first time it was called on to determine whether an offense would trigger 
ACCA’s sentencing provisions. In more than twenty years, the Court has 
never professed to stray from this approach: an offense’s elements and 
statutory definition should be the only dispositive factors in deciding 
whether to count it as an ACCA predicate under the residual provision. 
If in practice the Court displayed less than complete fidelity to the 
categorical approach in cases involving ACCA’s residual provision, the 
reasons which prompted the Court to adopt it in the first place have not 
lessened in force. In particular, fairness and constitutional concerns—
that a defendant be able to contest factors underlying a sentence and 
demand they be proved in court—are implicated when a sentencing 
court resorts to an “ordinary case” approach or statistics, neither of 
                                                     
discussion. Id. 
437. Id. Molinaro argued that the prior case had been wrongly decided. United States v. Dismuke 
was in the group the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari to along with Rogers. See supra notes 
340–345 and accompanying text. 
438. See Molinaro, 428 F. App’x at 651–52. 
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which may have been argued or briefed by the parties. In determining 
that vehicle flight presented a sufficient risk of physical injury to another 
to qualify as an ACCA predicate under the residual provision, the Sykes 
Court made only one argument based entirely on the Indiana statute 
defining that offense: that Indiana’s determination to punish two flight 
offenses equally implied a legislative determination that both presented 
equal risk. Because only this basis for the Sykes opinion comports fully 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s own precedent, the district and circuit 
courts should read Sykes as a narrow decision regarding a particular 
statute, rather than a broad declaration that vehicle flight counts as an 
ACCA predicate no matter how a state defines it. Circuit court decisions 
since Sykes, however, indicate that most courts are reading Sykes broadly 
rather than narrowly. As illustrated by the case of Marcus Sykes, who 
saw his sentence increased fifteen-fold by his prior vehicle-flight 
conviction, ACCA levies too harsh a penalty to be applied with anything 
less than the caution demanded by the categorical approach. 
 
